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Abstract 
Transfer pricing policy in vertically-integrated company is an integral component of the efficient 
management. The way it is exercised defines the profitability and the level of competitiveness of the 
firm. Russian oil and gas sector possesses prominent resources and its revenues are one of the biggest 
in Russia. Though Russian market is a young one, it is to catch up with developed countries and to 
implement the successful international experience within a shorter period of time. Thus, Russian oil 
and gas sector faces problems regarding transfer pricing which is due to the lack of understanding, 
and trust between regulative authorities and companies. New rules were introduced in 2012 and the 
consequences of them are just showing up. That is why, emphasis in this paper is put on how is 
transfer pricing defined in oil and gas sector Russia nowadays. 
At first, I conducted a literature study to get a proper understanding of transfer pricing and related 
international practices that helped me to elaborate theoretical framework for future research. In the 
next part I developed methodology that was about choice of the legislative documents; construction 
of questionnaires and interview guide developing. It allowed me to look at the problem from a 
triangle perspective, by this increasing the validity of my research. As a result, I got a legislative base 
structured according to the examined topics, questionnaires filled in by the consultants from the 
Russian brunch of the Big 4 and the in-depth interviews with the experts from Russian oil and gas 
companies. At last, I compared the results received from three different types of sources. 
This study helped me to define transfer pricing in oil and gas sector in Russia. It showed that Russian 
regulative authorities are trying to incorporate experience of foreign countries. However, the 
implementation of the successful international practices is not always efficient as it contradicts with 
the national legislative base. Moreover, the suggested by the theory guidelines on transfer pricing do 
not meet the reality. Still, the basis for its development in oil and gas sector in Russia is promising. 
Regulation authorities are elaborating clarification letters to make the laws understandable for 
companies. 
As a conclusion to this master thesis, I made several proposals for improvements that will help to 
accelerate the process of transfer pricing integration into the Russian business environment.  
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Writing this thesis has been an unprecedent and an outstanding experience for me. I will not lie and 
say that I have had to face many challenges during this period. There have been successful days that 
have brought a lot of progress to my work as well as days with no progress at all when I was at a 
stand and did not know where and how to move further. Hopefully, I have had a support and 
motivation team of supervisors, experts and close people whose advice made me accomplish my 
work. I highly appreciate their input into my work and would like to give my thanks to: 
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insights into the professional level and to sharpen my personal skills. I have gained confidence that I 
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an exception in this question. I hope that this thesis will contribute positively as a source of 
information and motivation for future research and for the possible changes in the real sector. 
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Main terms and definitions 
Transfer pricing – “A transfer price is a price, adopted for book- keeping purposes, which is used to 
value transactions between affiliated enterprises integrated under the same management at artificially 
high or low levels in order to effect an unspecified income payment or capital transfer between those 
enterprises” (OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, 2003). “Transfer price – an amount of money 
charged by one department in a company to supply goods or services to another department in the 
same company, or from one company to another in a group. Some firms use transfer prices as a way 
of moving profits into “low-tax countries” (Cambridge Business English Dictionary, 2015). 
Associated enterprises - are unit, subsidiary, business unit, division, affiliate, affiliated company, 
dependent company, a company of a group and so on. 
The subsidiary: “a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State; b) or the same persons 
participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a 
Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are 
made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but 
for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have 
not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly” (Article 9, 
OECD Model Tax Convention, 2003). 
To decentralize – “to move the operations of a business or other organization from a single, central 
place to several smaller ones. Transfer of decision making power and assignment of accountability 
and responsibility for results. It is accompanied by delegation of commensurate authority to 
individuals or units at all levels of an organization even those far removed from headquarters or other 
centers of power” (Cambridge Business English Dictionary, 2015). 
Transaction – “is an agreement between a buyer and a seller to exchange goods, services or financial 
instruments” (Investopedia, 2016). 
Controlled transaction – “transactions between two enterprises that are associated enterprises with 
respect to each other” (OECD Glossary of tax terms, 2016). 
Comparability analysis – “comparison of controlled transaction conditions with conditions 
prevailing in transactions between independent enterprises (uncontrolled transactions). Controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions are comparable if none of the differences between the transactions 
could materially affect the factor being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or if 
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reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of any such 
differences” (OECD Glossary of tax terms, 2016). 
APA (Advance pricing agreement) - “An arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled 
transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments 
thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those 
transactions over a fixed period of time. An APA is formally initiated by a taxpayer and requires 
negotiations between the taxpayer, one or more associated enterprises, and one or more tax 
administrations. APAs are intended to supplement the traditional administrative, judicial, and treaty 
mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing issues. They may be most useful when traditional 
mechanisms fail or are difficult to apply” (OECD, 2010). Or to put it more simple it is a contract, 
usually for multiple years, between a taxpayer and at least one tax authority specifying the pricing 
method that the taxpayer will apply to its related-company transactions (PWC, 2016). 
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) - “is a multilateral 
organization comprised of 30 countries, which are mostly Western European countries and other 
industrialized countries including US and Japan. Founded in 1961, the OECD provides a forum for 
representatives of countries to discuss and attempt to coordinate economic and social policies. It has 
an especially significant role in international tax matters” (OECD Glossary of tax terms, 2016). 
Functional analysis - “an analysis of the functions performed (taking into account assets used and 
risks assumed) by associated enterprises in controlled transactions and by independent enterprises in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions” (OECD Glossary of tax terms, 2016). 
Mutual agreement procedure (MAP) - “A means through which tax administrations consult to 
resolve disputes regarding the application of double tax conventions. This procedure, described and 
authorized by Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, can be used to eliminate double 
taxation that could arise from a transfer pricing adjustment” (OECD Glossary of tax terms, 2016). 
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Introduction 
The application by the corporation of transfer prices is an objective process of doing business. It 
helps to minimize tax liability, which sometimes has a negative impact on budget revenues. 
In international practice, the "arm's length" principle is used when the control over controlled 
transactions is exercised. According to this principle the transaction price should be equal or close to 
the price between independent companies that are comparable to those of the controlled transaction 
and operate in the same economic conditions. The "arm's length" principle is used as a comparison 
price for the transactions between independent companies, as well as to compare the level of 
profitability of companies involved in such transactions. 
In the Russian Federation on the basis of OECD recommendations, the Federal Law of 18.07.2011 
№ 227-FZ "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in connection 
with the improvement of the taxation price determination principles" (hereinafter - the Federal Law 
№ 227-FZ) was introduced. 
Why is it particularly important for Russia? This phenomenon is rather new to the Russian economy 
compared to the international experience as the new law about the Transfer pricing system in Russia 
was introduced only in 2012 and there is a lack of that type of experience in the history of the 
Russian Economy. However, the Russian economy has been a market one for merely 25 years now 
and this issue needs to be studied carefully. 
Russian tax system is not that sophisticated and still needs to be improved. One of the instruments 
that contribute to the use of the tax system in favor of companies is transfer pricing. As it has been 
stated by Purvez F. Captain, American Director of the Transfer Pricing and Economics practice for 
Ernst & Young LLP, and Margaret Brown, member of EY's Transfer Pricing and Economics practice 
for the Southwest Region, transfer pricing is being misunderstood as a way to shift profits to affiliates 
in low-tax jurisdiction (Brown, Purvez, 2014). 
They say that this view is very narrow-minded. Transfer pricing can both contribute and deteriorate 
the country’s economy. On the one hand, transfer pricing if it is well managed can be used by 
authorities and enterprises to “reduce audit controversy while proving to apportion income fairly 
among the multiple taxing jurisdictions worldwide” (Brown, Purvez, 2014). 
On the other hand, transfer pricing can not only lead to the shift of profits to the low-tax jurisdiction 
that will deteriorate the country’s economy and decrease the social benefits to the population (natural 
resources in Russia are considered to be used and protected as a base of life and activity of people 
living on its territory (Article 9, The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993) and the oil and gas 
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companies get the rights to extract natural resources undertaking certain obligations in regard to the 
society and the citizens (Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 21.02.1992 № 2395-1). Moreover, 
it can bring losses to other stakeholders, implying additional audits and litigation, possible 
nondeductible penalties and double taxation. 
This project aims to describe and analyze the transfer pricing in Russian oil and gas companies. 
The first pillar of my research is that Russian tax system has just recently incorporated some 
international practices. Even the analysis of the cases with controlled transactions that took place in 
2012 investigated by regulative authorities is going to be presented this year. Up to now, it is quite 
difficult to evaluate the efficiency of the new rules and the way they have influenced the modern 
economy. Some of the Russian experts made an attempt to analyze and made an overview of the new 
rules (Simonov, 2014, Lemeskina, 2012). Though they did not apply the new system to the 
companies, they did not try to analyze the way companies will react on it. Russian researchers (e.g. 
Pashkus, 2000), examined the rules that used to be before the innovations of 2012. However, he 
studied the transfer pricing problem from the view of information management. Korabelnikova and 
Serov in 2011 tried to compare the tax peculiarities of the transfer pricing in Russia with those in 
some other foreign countries, however, they did not dwell on the companies. Nepesov (2007) studied 
the way the arm’s length principle can be applied but did not explain how can it be introduced in 
Russia. Shapovalov (2012) tried to outline the points of the new law that can be interpreted 
differently. This ambiguous interpretation found endorsement in the appearance of the big amount of 
clarification letters published by Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. It shows that this 
topic is important for Russian economy and Russian authorities pays a lot of attention to it. 
The second pillar is that Russian companies are not used to operate in the transparent environment. 
Being always unsure about where exactly their taxes will go many Russian vertically-integrated 
companies are tend to have their accounts in the law tax jurisdictions outside the territory of Russian 
Federation. It is normal that any business tries to maximize its profits and minimizes its taxes within 
the legal framework. However, it is not always the case for Russia. We know enough cases when the 
companies tried to shift their profits illegally, as YUKOS, for example. Nevertheless, nowadays the 
Russian government is trying to implement successful international practices and improve the 
system, make it transparent and make the business trust the government. That is why it is high time 
for companies to try to learn to minimize their taxes within the legal frameworks. For instance, as the 
arm’s length principle is to be applied to the controlled transactions the companies should themselves 
determine that transfer prices that are comparable to the market prices. 
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The third pillar of this research is that especially Russia oil and gas sector encounters the problems 
tied to the transfer pricing. Why? Oil and gas companies generate huge profits: being able to extract 
natural resources they are bound to pay relevant taxes. For most Russian oil and gas companies it is 
easier to be present at and control every stage of the value chain process. Thus, they form companies 
that encompass many subsidiaries being responsible for certain functions. They are called vertically 
integrated companies. The relations between the units are to be realized at a certain price that is a 
transfer price. The taxes from Russia oil and gas sector form 20% of the GDP of the Russian 
Federation and 55% of the federal budget (Medvedev, cited in Kommersant, 2015). For example, 
Khanty Mansiysk Autonomous District where are most of the oil and gas production activities are 
concentrated accounts for 28% of the receipts to the federal budget (Report of Ministry of Finance of 
the Russian Federation, 2015). Thus, it is particularly interesting to examine the question of transfer 
pricing in relation to the oil and gas sector. 
Research questions. 
In my study I have decided to state the following research question: 
How is transfer pricing defined in oil and gas sector in Russia? 
In order to find an answer to this question I will discuss the following issues. I will study the concept 
of transfer pricing, the current situation in Russia with transfer pricing. I will examine the way 
international practices taken into account. In order to do it I will analyze how the authorities approach 
the problem, how do consultants view the transfer pricing and what managers of the companies think 
about the current situation in transfer pricing. 
That will help to gather sufficient and credible data to find the answer to the main question of the 
research that will find out how the transfer pricing actually defined in oil and gas sector in Russia 
from a triangle perspective. 
Firstly, I will explain the background of the research. Then, I will make a theoretical framework for 
my research that is based on theory of transaction cost economics, the principle of the 
decentralization in management and different approaches to the transfer pricing methods. In 
methodological chapter I will explain the methods used to study the problem, how the data was 
gathered. In empirical chapter I will describe the results of the conducted research: analysis of 
documents, questionnaires filled by the consultants from the biggest advisory companies such as 
Deloitte, E&Y, PWC and conversations with the managers from the oil and gas companies. And in 
the analytical chapter I will examine and confront theory and practice and outline the most important 
results in the conclusion.  
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1. Background of the study 
1.1. Transfer pricing in Russia. Overview 
This year it has been 25 years since the Russian economy turned to be a market. In some cases, a 
period of 25 years can considered being rather a long one, but not when it deals with economy. 
Especially, when we speak about the economy of a country with the biggest territory in the world that 
provides its population with amount of various resources that can be beneficially used. It is not a 
surprise that at the beginning of the 90s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had to face a 
number of challenges that not every country can cope with. 
During this 25-year period, Russian Federation has developed from a country with a ruined economy 
to the one that is spinning up from day to day. If in 1991 Russian GDP was equal to 571 US Dollars 
(current price), in 2016 it is equal to 1 860,6 US Dollars even though there has been a slump in the 
economy recently due to the existing oil crisis, the consequences of which many extracting countries 
had to encounter (Trading Economics, 2016). 
In order to keep pace with the world leading economy, Russian government implements and 
introduces new rules that will put the country on the next stage of the development process. Transfer 
pricing is not an exception in this question. Being a country with a huge amount of natural resources 
Russia has a certain number of vertically-integrated oil and gas companies that present the whole 
value chain process. Consequently, these companies have to have different units that fulfill their 
functions: production, refining, transportation, distribution, retail, some of them have subsidiaries in 
other countries as they sell the products to the foreign markets. Here comes the issue of transfer price 
when the one unit of the organization has to sell a good or a service to another unit of the 
organization. What is this price? How is it calculated? All these questions are seeking for answers, as 
the price at which the product is sold will be later tax assessed. When we deal with the oil and gas 
industry, which is represented by Russian majors, it is easily to imagine what volumes pass between 
the units. 
That is why, on January 1st, 2012, new rules for tax control for transfer pricing were introduced into 
the Russian legislation by the Federal Law № 227-FZ. More than three years have already passed 
since the adoption of the new law. The understanding of the application of the new rules has been 
developing gradually during this time. The Russian Ministry of Finance of Russian and the Federal 
Tax Service of Russia are actively educate on various issues evolving in connection with the use of 
new transfer pricing legislation: hold conferences, participate in round tables with the business 
community, give explanations and letters, provide comments on the application of certain articles of 
Section V.1 of the Tax Code. 
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In 2012, taxpayers rebuilt intercompany relations in accordance with the new rules of transfer 
pricing: they determined the controlled transaction, reviewed the existing approaches to pricing, 
prepared documentation, applied for the conclusion of the advance pricing agreements (there are 
about 15 agreements on the domestic controlled transactions). By November 20th 2013, taxpayers 
documented the controlled transactions for the first time (PWC, 2016). Currently, the tax authorities 
have initiated the first inspections on the compliance with the transfer pricing normative legislative 
acts for the 2012 – 2013 period. In addition to that, the legislation on the compliance with the arm’s 
length principle in the controlled transactions transactions made prior to the entry into force of the 
new provisions of the Tax Code is still ongoing. 
As the basis for the new rules the principles and guidelines were elaborated by the OECD, as well as 
the practice of transfer pricing rules in a number of foreign countries. It is worth mentioning that at 
present Russian tax authorities are carrying out an active exchange of experiences with foreign 
colleagues within the framework of the concluded agreements, as well as during the international 
conferences and round tables on the topic of application of transfer pricing rules, conduction of tax 
audits and conclusion of pricing agreements. 
The development of the Russian legal framework for transfer pricing is significantly influenced by 
changes in the approach to certain issues of transfer pricing in the world. In particular, innovations in 
guidelines on transfer pricing and other OECD regulations governing the basics of transfer pricing in 
OECD countries, attracted close attention of the Russian tax authorities. At present, it is possible to 
say that the revision of the sixth chapter of the OECD Guidelines on transfer pricing (deal with 
intangible assets) is likely to lead to in the future certain changes in the Russian tax legislation 
(Lemeskina,2012). 
Moreover, in early 2013 the OECD published a plan to counter the erosion of the tax base and shift 
of profits to the law tax jurisdictions (BEPS - base erosion and profit shifting). The report also 
contained specific directions on the development of the international legal framework to reduce the 
opportunities for the erosion of the tax base and the reduction of the taxes that suppose to come to the 
state budget. These issues are discussed at the meetings of heads of state and finance ministers as 
well as during round tables organized by the Russian tax authorities to exchange experiences in the 
application of transfer pricing legislation. 
Despite the similarity of the Russian transfer pricing rules with the OECD recommendations, the 
Russian rules have their own specific character, and in some cases are fundamentally different from 
international practice. Existing rules provide, among other things, an increase in the administrative 
burden on Russian companies engaged in transactions with foreign interdependent companies. These 
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regulations affect international companies engaged in the sale or purchase of goods in its Russian 
subsidiary and other affiliated companies in Russia (Usov, 2014). 
Therefore, taxpayers, international companies should pay close attention to how the conditions of 
intra-global transfer pricing policies correspond to the Russian tax legislation, and what changes need 
to be made in documentation prepared for the Russian objectives to meet the current regulations of 
the Tax Code. 
1.2. Oil and gas sector in Russia 
In order to study the transfer pricing system in oil and gas field in Russia it is necessary to give an 
overview of this sector of Russian economy. 
It is a well-known fact that Russia possesses a big amount of national resources, and oil and gas are 
on the list. Extraction and refining plays a key role in the development of many regions of the 
Russian Federation. There are several areas with significant oil and gas resources, which are called 
oil and gas provinces. These include traditional extraction regions of Western Siberia, the Volga 
region, the North Caucasus, and new oil and gas provinces: in the European North (the Timan-
Pechora region), in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East. 
According to OPEC, Russia was the first country regarding world crude oil production in 2014, 
producing 10, 2211 barrels per day what is 13,92% of the world production (OPEC, 2015). And the 
amount of world proven crude oil reserves were 80,000 million barrels compared to 36, 520 million 
barrels in the United States, however the number of active rigs in Russia was equal only to 307 and in 
the US to 1,881 in 2014. That can be explained by harsh condition on the territories rich in fuel 
resources and less activity both in time and physical dimensions. Russia supplies 10, 576 barrels per 
day. However, Russian refining capacity is rather poor compared to the produced volume – only 6, 
004 barrels/cd and in the US 17, 859 b/cd. The output of refined petroleum products in Russia is 6, 
6361 b/d and in the USA 19, 426 1 These numbers show the incline of Russian economy to the rough 
production of the resources, however the supply of the refined products could be much more 
beneficial (OPEC, 2015). 
For example, in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area is concentrated about 90% of Russian and 22% of 
the world gas production. The second world biggest gas field Urengoi is situated there. The volumes 
of gas exceed 10 trillion cubic meters. One of the biggest discovered Russian oil fields is 
Tuimazinskoe, it was discovered in 1937 but the production is still on the go. Tuimazinskoe is the 
fifth biggest oil field in the world. The biggest Russian oil field is Samotlor. About 2,3 billion tons of 
oil have already been recovered from this field and 2,7 billion are still remain in the ground 
(Rospriroda, 2016). 
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Currently, about 84% of oil exported from Russia, enters the pipeline system. Of the remaining 16% - 
13% are supplied by trains and the remained 3% - are shipped by vessels. The sole operator of oil 
pipelines in Russia is OJSC "AK" Transneft", which accounts for 97% of shipments of all oil 
produced in the country. The total length of the pipeline system is more than 217 000 kilometers, 
46 700 of which are oil pipelines and 19 300 are pipelines for oil products. They connect the main oil 
and gas regions of Russia with sales markets in Western and Eastern Europe (Rospriroda, 2016). 
At present the main export oil pipelines are the Baltic Pipeline System (Yaroslavl-Primorsk, 
throughput of this system is 74 million tons per year), Druzhba pipeline, the northern branch of 
which goes to Poland, and Southern - to Slovakia (its throughput is 90 million tons per year); Black 
Sea pipelines - Samara-Odessa (throughput - 12 million tons per year) and the Samara-Novorossiysk 
(43 million tons per year) (Mirnefti, Rosneft, 2016). 
Currently, there are four directions of the export and of transit of Russian oil through the territory of 
the CIS countries from Russia are being developed: Caspian-Black Sea - Mediterranean, Northern 
Baltic, Central European and East-Siberian. One of the most promising is the East-Siberian area due 
to the growth in oil consumption in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in China. This last direction 
still remains encouraging despite the recent slump in the Chinese economy (Mirnefti, Rosneft, 2016). 
The outcomes of the activity of the Russian oil and gas sector is the basis for the provision of the 
country's balance of payments, it supports the national currency and plays a major role in the 
formation of investment resources.  The economy of the Russian Federation still depends on the oil 
and gas companies' profits. About 55% of the Federal budget is formed from their revenues 
(Medvedev, cited in Kommersant, 2015). Market value of equity of the oil companies is a half of the 
Russian stock market capitalization. By virtue of the high economic indicators of oil companies, the 
Russian National Welfare Fund and the Reserve Fund were founded. 
Among the biggest Russian oil companies there are: Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, Gazpromneft, 
Tatneft, Slavneft, Bashneft, Rusneft and Gazprom. All these companies are vertically - integrated oil 
companies. Some of them control the whole value chain process from up-stream to down - stream, 
some of them use the services of the Russian major mid-stream company Transneft. Still they can 
have production, distribution and retail components of the value chain process. Moreover, they are 
presented in different industries. Every vertically integrated company possesses a certain amount of 
divisions. In order to establish effective cooperation between the units and increase the 
competitiveness a company has to determine a transfer price. However, doing business companies try 
to optimize their taxes and they use transfer pricing system to shift the profits from one business unit 
to another, moving the tax assessment base to the low tax jurisdiction. Though, it is not always the 
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case and the question of transfer pricing remains acute both for the companies and for the tax 
authorities. 
These facts show that transfer pricing is essential for Russian economy. Many companies being 
vertically integrated are to use transfer prices to pursue their goals. The only problem is that their 
goals can contradict with the government and the social view on the use of natural resources.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
The concept of transfer price is relatively new to the Russian economy which can be proved by the 
recent constituting of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation in the view of specificity and 
uniqueness of the history of the Russian Federation. However, the international practice of transfer 
pricing is highly experienced and counts practically one hundred years due to the presence of market 
economy in Western countries. That is why in the theoretical part of this paper I will appeal more to 
the international practice and to the works of the western scientist as a basis of my further research. 
Firstly, there was a need to address Coase (1937) where the roots of transfer prices were examined 
such as the growth of the company's size, the dependence between the size and its efficiency. Coase 
made a huge input into the generation of the «transaction cost» theory that was later elaborated by 
other scientists. Moreover, he included the risk problem studied by Knight (1921) who connected 
allocation of responsibilities with risk taking in companies. Furthermore, Coase examined the impact 
of the new technologies on the managerial techniques. The ambiguous point of the interdependence 
of the further components was studied. As a result of the new technologies interference managerial 
techniques will tend to improve. This fact leads to the company's growth in size though the size as it 
is, is considered to bring inefficiency. From the starting roots I moved to the theory of transfer 
pricing. 
Wissema (1992) studied the level of the company's centralization and its impact on the transfer 
pricing. In this context there were examined the responsibilities centers, their types and involvement 
in the transfer pricing process. Also the problem of the consistent information by was raised. Top 
management can settle a proper transfer price only if the units’ managers provide relevant 
information (Pashkus and Pashkus, 2000). The level of the disclosure of the information depends on 
the nature of the market (Verrechia, 1983). Thus, a main task of a manager is to construct a model of 
measurement of the divisional activities which implies motivation for the highest information 
disclosure. Williamson mentioned other factors that he considered to be important with the reference 
to this problem, among them there are: the specificity of the assets, opportunism and organic 
rationality (Williamson, 1979). 
And thirdly, the different models and approaches to the transfer price settlement were examined. 
Among them there were defined: negotiated price, the adjusted external- market price and the cost 
based price. 
The first to provide an economic basis for transfer pricing was Hirshleifer who showed that under 
static conditions and under certainty the generally correct transfer price for a product is the marginal 
cost of the producing division. His theory was based on the assumptions but the single objective of a 
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firm is to maximize its profit. After that Kanodia tried to extend the model to the environment of 
uncertainty, however the problem of divisional autonomy was left behind (Kanodia, 1979). The next 
examined approach was the accounting approach to the transfer price settlement. In this case, transfer 
price is calculated on the basis of the corporate information about the costs. The price is a profit of 
the selling unit and costs of the buying one. The main drawback of this approach is that it does not 
take into account the organizational and psychological components (Solomons, 1965). In order to 
include these components, the principle of negotiated price was settled. It was discovered that the 
units of organisation can have different even contradictive interests and that the transfer price is a 
result of a long negotiation process (Cyert, March, 1963). 
The summary of the empirical research concerning different approaches to transfer pricing was 
described in the Emmanuel and Mehafdi’s book “Transfer Pricing” (Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994) 
and in Borkowski’s 1996 article (Borkowski, 1996). 
After that, I tried to examine the transfer pricing methods, especially those yielded from the arm's 
length principle, where I found out a division between traditional transaction methods and 
transactional profit methods. The OECD guidelines provide thorough explanation of the strength and 
weakness of the suggested methods and the conditions which they suit the best. However, still each 
situation is unique and especially in such a new economy as Russian, where the rules of the well 
established market economy can not always work in their best way. 
The phenomenon is rather new to the Russian economy comparing to the international experience. As 
the law about Transfer pricing system in Russia was introduced only in 2012, and there is a lack of 
that type of experience in the history of the Russian Economy. However, the Russian economy has 
been a market one for merely 25 years now and this issue need to be studied carefully. 
This examination of the written material on the topic enabled to immerse in the transfer pricing 
problem in order to carry out qualified research that will include all the international experience, still, 
taking into account the peculiarities of the Russian economy. 
2.1. Transaction cost economics 
The transaction costs theory derived from the neoclassical economics where have been made certain 
assumptions about the behavior of the human agents. While in the neoclassical economics humans 
are viewed to be rational agents who try to choose the alternative regarding the maximization of their 
utility function. However, transaction costs economics, according to Williamson, can be 
distinguished from neoclassical economics by the recognition of the possibility that people are 
subject to bounded rationality and the assumption that people can react opportunistically. That means 
that the utility is not the only factor taken into account by a human agent and that there are other 
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factors relying on which an agent acts with bounded rationality. However, the bounded rationality 
should not be considered as hyper rationality or irrationality as although the “organization man” who 
is examined in the transaction costs economics differs from the “economic man” examined in the 
neoclassical economics the intrinsic by him/her rationality is the intended one. Here comes the 
economic theory of comprehensive contracting that helps to effectively organize the exchange 
process between the agents with bounded rationality with a help of contracts. Still due to the 
possibility of the opportunistic behavior it can be difficult to predict all the cases. That is why the 
incomplete contracting is the solution to control an agent (Williamson, 1981). All the mentioned 
factors show that the “organizational man” is more complex agent than an “economic one” and the 
aim of the transaction costs economics is try to eliminate the deviation of the “organizational man” 
from his principles and intentions that implies transaction costs. More generally, the purpose of the 
transaction costs economics is to explain the problems of the efficiency of some economic operations 
within the certain institutional limits, which is to say the ability of different organizational forms to 
proceed positive development and the achievement of the economic goals, where any economic act is 
aligned with costs. 
The transaction costs theory in the frame of the neoinstitutional approach also explains the vertical 
integration by the existence of the costs of the interaction of the different market agents. Oliver 
Williamson outlined the factors when the transaction costs become maximal, and their minimization 
demands vertical integration. According to his experiments, the level of the transaction costs depends 
on the: 
1) specificity of the resources involved in the transaction process; 
2) frequency with which a certain transaction occurs; 
3) the level of uncertainty. 
He also pointed out that the specificity is the most important factor among those, and that it can be 
divided into three groups: site specificity (closer location makes the transaction easier), physical asset 
specificity (tangible assets contributes to the efficiency of the transaction) and human asset 
specificity (“that arises from learning by doing”) (Williamson, 1981). In other words, the more 
specific, frequent and uncertain the act is the higher are the transaction costs during the realization of 
the operation in the market. 
Developing this research with the examination of the conditions where market failures may occur 
(market statics, contract incompleteness, information processing, institutional adaptations), 
Williamson defined the conditions when the vertical integration in the company becomes more 
favorable than the market. 
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Moreover, the transaction costs theory not only examines the mechanism of the vertical integration 
that diminishes the transaction costs but also defines the frames of the company’s explanation and 
consequently the limits of the vertical integration. 
As it has already been mentioned in this paper before, Ronald Coase, one of the founding fathers of 
the theory, pointed out that a company can expand to the extent when the marginal costs related to 
the use of the market are equal to the marginal costs related to the use of the mechanism of vertical 
integration. 
2.2. Transfer pricing 
Here I will discuss the goals of the transfer price settlement, what was it initially aimed at and the 
transfer pricing process as a basis of the corporate relationships. 
The importance of transfer price can be described by the following arguments: it estimates the 
quantity and the frequency of the transfers, it has an impact on profits and costs of business units, it 
allows to calculate the earnings and costs of each unit, it is a basis for the estimation of the financial 
result of the divisions and it is a basis for the motivation of the managers’ divisions and its efficient 
management. 
The aims of transfer pricing are also outlined by Anthony and Dearden (1984). Among them there are 
such as: 
 A system of transfer pricing should motivate divisional managers to make effective decisions 
and provide information for their justification. This case is only possible when managers 
trying to increase the profit of their units, contributes to the growth of the profit of the 
company as a whole; 
 Decisions on the size of the transfer price should reflect the division’s profitability and 
present a criteria for estimation the efficiency of the unit’s activities, as during the process of 
transfer of the goods or services the profits of one division become the losses of another unit; 
 A system of transfer pricing should not interfere into the division’s autonomy. It is impossible 
to do these two processes at the same time: to give managers additional responsibility and to 
settle the internal prices in a centralized way (Anthony, Dearden 1984). 
Transfer pricing exists when there are transfers of goods and services within one company. Thus, 
corporate commercial activity is a premise for the settlement of the transfer pricing system. The 
question is why do all these types of activities take place inside the enterprise? 
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Here it is necessary to pay attention to the transactional cost economics. From this angle, depending 
on the nature of the transaction, there can be either the managerial structure or the contraction. 
According to Oliver Williamson who used Coase’s ideas to construct market models that reflect the 
economy of the transaction costs, in case of complex transactions, hierarchies substitute markets as 
there are high market transaction costs and the risks caused by the external exchange. It is more 
appropriate for the “like” repeated operations, which demand the investments into the particular 
human and capital assets (Williamson 1979). 
The empirical studies conducted by the Emmanuel proves the dependence between the specificities 
of the product and a decision to produce or to buy and the choice of the transfer price settlement. 
These are mostly common for the sectors which is a subject to the technologic changes. Some 
companies internationalize the commerce at all the stages of the production and distribution and 
become vertically integrated companies of the high level. For example, enterprises from the oil and 
gas sector which is particularly interesting for this paper (Emmanuel 1976). 
Although the case with the transaction costs is not the only reason for the shift to the transfer pricing. 
According to the Hirshleifer, the existence and the type of the transfer price system had the nature 
and goals of the decentralized management as a basis (Emmanual, 1977). It means that the system of 
transfer pricing should be in compliance with the business strategy and the organizational structure of 
a particular firm. From that point of view, McAulaay and Tomkins distinguished four groups of the 
transfer price settlement: 
 Functional need; 
 Economic need; 
 Organizational need; 
 Strategic need (McAulay, Tomkins, 1992). 
The concept of functional need relates to the division of the firm into the responsibilities centers or 
profit centers. This leads to the evaluation of their activities and the motivation of their managers. 
The economic component states for the efficient distribution among the responsibilities centers the 
finite resources in order to achieve the company’s goals. 
In the frame of the organizational part of the firm with a divisional structure the system of transfer 
pricing is used as an instrument of integration and differentiation.  
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And though, the traditional approach to the transfer price settlement was focused on the operational 
decisions and left behind the strategic component, nowadays transfer pricing system is considered to 
be a vital to the elaboration of the proper strategic decisions. 
If transfer pricing is considered to be a system that helps to analyze the company’s strategy, then it is 
possible to look at it from the point of view of the value chain (Porter, 1980). Porter’s value chain is a 
complex phenomenon. Before the market economy the only goal of the firm was to create the value 
for the company itself. The main focus of each manager was to gain as much profit as possible 
creating value just for the firm. But the time has passed and today all the companies as a long term 
strategy choose a creation of the value for their customers for society and for other stakeholders. I 
will elaborate on this topic later in my work, discussing the negative aspects of transfer pricing. 
Coming back to the company’s value chain it is possible to outline its three features: 
 Determination of the competitive advantage; 
 Identification of the relationships in the creation of the value chain; 
 Formulation of the common strategies in order to achieve and maintain competitive advantage 
(among them there could be differentiation, concentration, costs leadership). 
A company achieves competitive advantage creating value and generating earnings. The components 
of the value such as low costs, the growth of the sales rate and margin level or the ability of a 
company to create value depends on the fields attractiveness, a competitive position of the company 
and on its strategy. 
The value chain of the whole company is focused on the certain units which work is to achieve and 
maintain a firm’s competitive advantage. This fact helps managers to analyze which divisions 
generate and increase earning and which are not (Herbert, Morris, 1989). 
A system of transfer pricing consists of different types of activities which contributes to the 
company’s competitive advantage. If the transfer price is not profitable for one of the participant of 
the internal trade then this activity does not make profit. This fact decreases the ability of single units 
and the whole company to generate earnings. 
Though this approach of the value chain is rather limited as it can not answer the question whether 
the transfer pricing contributes to the creation of value and how much the ability to create value of 
one responsibility center depends on this ability of another one. 
It is important to mention a multi-disciplinary framework for transfer pricing presented by Emmanuel 
and Mehafdi (Emmanual & Mehafdi, 1994). It does not only give an overview of the whole transfer 
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pricing problems but shows the causes, effects and purposes of transfer pricing. Furthermore, the 
authors combined the organizational theory with transaction cost economics and add the factors 
examined by other theories that had been previously neglected. Among these theories there are a 
value chain theory that has been examined above and the agency theory.  
Coming back to the functional need of the transfer pricing mentioned above and the role of 
decentralization in the firms it’s important to examine the concept of the responsibility center and its 
place in the transfer pricing theory. 
2.3. Responsibility centers in transfer pricing 
Responsibility center is the key element of the transfer pricing system. It is a business unit of the 
organization which can be distinguished by specific features. In order to present all of them correctly 
it would be helpful to refer to the work of J.G. Wissema “Unit management: entrepreneurship and 
cohesion in the decentralized firm” of 1996 where he outlined the following characteristics of the 
division: 
Responsibility for its profits and losses where responsibility encouraged or guaranteed as it has been 
mentioned by the Professor Knight and earlier in the paper contributes to the further development of 
the divisions, the growth of its productivity and ability to make appropriate decisions which all in the 
end become a benefit for the whole firm. 
The second point is its own goods or services. Each business unit produce certain goods or services 
that later will be delivered to the internal or external market at a certain price. 
Distinctive functions. Responsibility center represents a separate division within a firm which has its 
own specific functions. 
A manager. Each center has its own manager who monitors the activities of the unit, make decisions 
and take responsibility within his powers. 
A connection with a firm. As each responsibility center is a business unit of the whole firm, a 
manager has to report to the top management on a regular basis and also informs or asks for approval 
of certain decisions.  At the same time top management has to be sure that the activity of this 
particular business unit and its development is not far behind the development of the whole 
organization. Moreover, as a part of the connection process a unit adopts a company’s corporate 
culture, its goals and mission (Wissema, 1992). 
The scientist tends to distinguish several kinds of responsibility centers: 
  24 
 Profit-center – a type of division which has a right to monitor its profits and losses itself. The 
effectiveness and productivity of this type of centers is evaluated according to their profit 
performance; 
 Сost-center – a unit which controls only its costs. This unit of the company usually does not 
interact with the external market directly. Its main objective is to minimize the costs of the 
output. Their performance is measured by the amount of deviation from the planned costs; 
 Expenses-center (cost account center) – is a type of center for which it is difficult to establish 
the dependence between earnings and costs. For example, a research department. Its 
performance is measured by amount of patents or innovations; 
 Investment-center – a unit which supervises costs, earning and investments. It is responsible 
for the equity and debt capitals. Its performance is mostly evaluated by the ROI (Return On 
Investments) ratio; 
 Revenue-center – a unit which is responsible only for its revenues. Its performance is 
estimated by the achieved corporate cash flows or profit margin. One of its objectives is to 
increase the sales rate. The more goods or services are produces by the firm the more 
responsibility centers it will tend to have. 
What does this division into centers give to a company? It helps to decrease the time needed to make 
a decision and to react to the customers’ requests, to raise the efficiency of the accounting system, to 
monitor revenues and to evaluate the results of the divisional activities. 
However, in order to be responsible for this or that type of activity to achieve and show better 
performance a unit has to possess certain powers. And it as it has already been mentioned before it is 
one of the main problems of the divisions of the company. 
2.4. How is transfer price settled in centralized and decentralized firms 
In the context of the delegation of powers it will be interesting to compare the differences between 
centralized and decentralized companies. As a continuation of the ideas presented above it is 
interesting to take a look at a “produce or sell” model in these two types of companies presented by 
the Pashkus. He outlines three main components for the comparison: availability of alternatives, 
powers and the informational flows, especially how much do top managers need to get the detailed 
information about the divisional activities. It is possible to present the result of his comparison in the 
table. 
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Decentralization Centralization 
Available alternatives 
Existence of the internal market 
Multi-functional assets 
Absence of the external market 
Company’s assets has a particular function 
Powers 
Freedom of using of external market 
Absence of the ability to use the external market 
Absence of the permission of the top 
management to change the use of the assets 
Informational flows 
Freedom of the transfer price settlement 
Lack of reporting to the top management 
Top management settles the transfer price 
Full reporting to the top management 
An actor responsible for decision making 
Manager of the unit Top management 
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of the systems with different level of centralization. Pashkus N.A., Pashkus V.Y., 2000 
Though this table provide systematized a clear comparison it is important to take a closer look at the 
problem of the information flows. The ability of the top management to settle the proper transfer 
price is based on the quality of the information provided by different units of the organization 
(Pashkus and Pashkus, 2000). That is why in the decentralized company the management of the 
informational flows has a special role. These flows can be involved both in external and internal 
activities of the company. The information is analyzed by different participants and is delivered to 
the further as managerial recommendations. 
To enhance the efficiency of the transfer pricing system there is a need to: 
 to have an integrated data base which operates in real time and provides centralized and 
simultaneous access to the information for all the units; 
 top managers and unit managers should on time receive the reliable information about the 
changes of the internal accounting; 
 to have possibility to get an additional information after the specific request; 
 to have special systems of the quick analysis of the available information. 
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However, even technologies and these managerial measures can not deal with the conflicts of 
interest. As a result of such a problem a unit manager decides not to provide the information at all or 
to disclose only part of the information. 
It is obvious that the manager tries to hide information that is usually not present in the financial 
statements. The level of the disclosure of the information depends on the nature of the market 
(Verrechia, 1983). This is the informational management of the organization that influences the 
disclosure of the reliable information. However, the level of the soundness of the information 
depends on the measures of its estimation. Thus, a main task of a manager is to construct a model of 
measurement of the divisional activities which implies motivation for the highest information 
disclosure. Williamson mentioned other factors that he considers to be important with the reference 
to this problem, among them there are: the specificity of the assets, opportunism and organic 
rationality (Williamson, 1979). 
It is only in power of the top management of the firm to analyze and evaluate the impact of a certain 
decisions of a unit on a whole company, as only he possesses all the available information. 
Consequently reliable and relevant information has to be sent to the central department in order to 
maximize the efficiency of the firm as a whole. On the other hand a top manager should not interfere 
a lot with the divisional activities as otherwise, the whole system of transfer pricing will stop 
working. All the managers should operate within certain frameworks. In most cases these limits are 
presented in quantitative terms. For example, the investment department can take decisions upon the 
projects the budget of which does not exceed 1 million dollars. The higher the level of hierarchy the 
more powers a manager has. It is also important to limit the divisional activities with the external 
market. For instance, a big portion of the unit’s goods distributed to the external market can affect the 
whole firm. 
Thus, a wise combination of limits and delegated powers gives the best results for the efficient 
operation of the transfer pricing system. In this context, these are new technologies which provide 
current managers with an unprecedented set of tools and techniques that enables to simultaneously 
analyze enormous amounts of information and do projections for the future in order to define 
possible risks and find ways to mitigate them. 
2.5. Transfer pricing methods 
The initial goals of transfer pricing and the theoretical framework for it, in particular transaction cost 
theory have been studied. Now, it is important to consider different models of transfer pricing. The 
economic basis of transfer pricing was provided by Hirshleifer who showed that under static 
conditions and under certainty the generally correct transfer price for a product is the marginal cost of 
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the producing division. His theory was based on the assumptions, but the single objective of a firm is 
to maximize its profit. Moreover, under his analysis all the divisional decisions are made in the 
environment of certainty. However, as it has already been studied companies operate in the 
environments with a certain level of uncertainty. Moreover, the company he examined does not 
depend on the demand or technologies. Thus, a transfer price in this case is price equal to the 
incremental costs (Hirshleifer, 1956). That is why there are other drawbacks of this model such as 
absence of the divisional autonomy and deviations in the managers’ behavior, such as inconsistent 
information transfer, particularly unreliable information concerning the divisional costs or negligence 
of risk or uncertainty. 
There were several attempts to optimize this model. Among them there is a work of Ch. Kanodia. 
She tried to extend the model to the environment of uncertainty, however the problem of divisional 
autonomy was left behind (Kanodia, 1979). However, the methods of linear and object-oriented 
programming that took into account the external factors and divisional restrictions made a progress in 
this field. She examined imperfect competition and tried to settle that type of transfer price which 
reflects optimum resources allocation considering restrictions and managerial behavior and motivates 
managers to disclose the information. 
Now it is important to study the accounting approach to the transfer price settlement. In this case, 
transfer price is calculated on the basis of the corporate information about the costs. The price is a 
profit of the selling unit and costs of the buying one. When the units are dependent each unit makes 
its own input into the revenue received from the final product. Here the role of the transfer price is to 
distribute this revenue and calculate the input of each division. That is why the top managers try to 
decide what to use as a transfer price – market price, universal formula or negotiated one. The main 
drawback of this approach is that it does not take into account the organizational and psychological 
components (Solomons, 1965). 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the stated above models focus only on profit maximization at the 
market with perfect competition absence of risk and proper behavior of its participants. This 
approach does not explain the company’s activities but adopt the price setting mechanism to the 
internal corporate market. 
When the assumption of the project maximization was considered to be not the only goal of each 
company, the people engaged into the corporate process, their input and interests were studied more 
thoroughly. It was discovered that they could have different, even contradictive interests and that the 
transfer price is a result of a long negotiation process (Cyert, March, 1963). Sometimes different 
units of the organization can follow oppositely directed interests. Thus, any decision concerning 
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transfer pricing implies the conflict of interests. For example, on the one side of the transaction there 
is an internal seller who wants to receive the highest price for his goods or services, however, on the 
other side of the transaction there is an internal buyer who wants to get the lowest possible price for 
the goods or services that he gets. Still, these both parties are on the same side, as what is the most 
important for the company as a whole, and for the top management is the final profit. That is why 
these units have to work on the same goal trying to maximize the total profit. 
However, sometimes the salary of the managers of a specific unit, their bonuses can depend on the 
income of their unit and the only goal they pursue is to maximize the profit of their particular unit, 
despite the indications provided by the central management of the company. That is why, negotiating 
the transfer price, the managers of the unit try to make other factors like quality, quantity, required 
investments etc. to be considered during the process of the determination of the transfer price 
(Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994). 
These additional interactions between the units impedes new factors that influence the transaction 
and consequently increases the complexity of the transfer price settlement. Negotiations are viewed 
to be the best way to find the correct transfer price that will help to include the factors of the 
relationship between the units that can be neglected when other methods are being used. 
However, the close relationship between the parties can bring an emotional aspect into the 
negotiation process that can negatively affect the determination of the transfer price. That is why in 
order to avoid the opportunistic behavior that the transaction cost theory tries to tackle, it can be 
relevant to let the parties negotiate the price themselves in order to avoid this type of behavior. It can 
be provoked by the central management’s forwarded tasks that can neglect the peculiarities of the 
relationship between the units of the company. 
This type of transfer price was supposed to contribute to encourage the motivation of the managers 
and to add the integrational component into their activities which will decline the possible risks 
provoked by the aggressive and inconsistent behavior (Ackelsberg, Yukl, 1979). 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that there are three main approaches to the transfer price settlement 
– the negotiated price, the adjusted external-market price and the cost based price (Cravens, 1997). 
These approaches vary in the amount of subunit autonomy. A negotiated price is «direct negotiation, 
between the seller and the buyer divisions. This approach involves little or even no higher-level 
management. Internal-market prices are employed when external referent prices do not exist or the 
firm’s strategy requires divisional flexibility. An adjusted external-market price is set in proximity to 
the external market prices and hence reduces the division managers’ autonomy to set the transfer 
price. For instance, an adjusted external-market price may be determined as the market price minus a 
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fixed discount, the best price to an outsider during a specific period, or the negotiated price with a 
listed price range. A cost-based price is set drawn from the supplier’s costs. This approach allows the 
selling division to charge a markup on the cost to cover overhead and provide a profit margin. This 
solution leaves the selling division with little flexibility in manipulating transfer prices because it 
requires the division to expose all cost-related information» (Dan Li. M.P. Ferreira, 2008). 
Table 1.2 summarizes these approaches and provides examples. All of them have their advantages 
and disadvantages and a particular model, for a certain form should better integrate different elements 
of the studies approaches to eliminate risks and cover all of the soft points. 
 
Table 2.2. A typology of transfer pricing. Dan Li. M.P. Ferreira, 2008. 
2.6. Transfer pricing methods in compliance with the arm's length principle 
In the previous sections there were examined different theories and frameworks that help to design a 
certain transfer pricing models. Now it is time to study the methods of the transfer price settlement 
regarding arm’s length principle. 
In order to settle correct transfer prices OECD members have agreed upon the arm’s length principle 
that is to be considered as an international standard for tax purposes. The principle states that 
transactions between closely related corporations have to be entered into with the same terms as if 
the transaction was between independent corporations under the same conditions and circumstances. 
All the methods developed in accordance with the arm’s length principle were combined by OECD in 
two groups: Traditional transaction methods and Transactional profit methods. Among the traditional 
methods, that are considered to be preferred, there are: comparable uncontrolled price method, resale 
price method and cost plus method. The transactional profit methods are used to reflect the 
specificity of the transaction better, for example, when the parties are engaged in closer mutually 
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profitable business relationship or when there is a lack or absence of the information on the similar 
transactions. Among that type of methods there are: transactional net margin method (TNMM) and 
transactional profit split method. 
OECD points out that the transfer pricing method of a certain transaction is always to be chosen as 
the most appropriate method in relation to its nature and the existing (prevailing) conditions. The 
selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method is always a thorough work on the choice of 
the method that better suits the case. Due to this, a lot of factors should be examined and taken into 
account. It’s essential to be aware of the strength and weaknesses of a particular method, to which 
situation it should be applied to. Moreover, there is a need to study attentively the transaction itself: 
its nature to examine which functional analysis is to be carried out (more about functional analysis - 
below in the section Arm’s length principle); the availability of the reliable information concerning 
the uncontrolled transactions and as a consequence the assessment of the comparability between 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions (OECD, 2010). 
2.6.1. Arm’s length principle 
Arm's length principle introduced by OECD literally means not let closer than the arm, keep at the 
arm’s length or keep at a distance. This rule is used in the taxation of the dependent companies. 
According to it, the taxes are to be withdrawn in compliance with the market prices for the 
transactions between the dependent tax payers. In other words, every unit in a corporation has to be 
treated as if it is an independent corporation. 
Arm’s length principle is formulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for multinational 
enterprises and tax administrations. OECD’s Guidelines Article 9 paragraph 1 says: 
“[When] conditions are made or imposed between ... two [associated] enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the 
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” (OECD, 2001). 
According to the OECD approach, two main purposes of the use of these principles are: fair 
allocation of the tax base between the jurisdictions and elimination of the dual pricing. This principle 
is also a measure to protect the government from the tax avoidance. As vertically integrated 
companies can easily avoid paying taxes by shifting their profits to the low-tax jurisdictions. 
The use of Arm’s length principle assumes, firstly, the comparison of the conditions between the 
associated companies and the circumstances that could be settled between the independent 
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companies, and, secondly, the assessment of profit that might occur as a result of interaction between 
the associated companies on the same principles as those that exist between the independent 
companies.  Thus, when the arm’s length principle is used the units of the company are treated as the 
independent ones. Arm’s length principle itself is formulated in the OECD Transfer pricing 
Guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. OECD’s article 9 paragraph 1 says: 
“[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two associated enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the 
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” (OECD, 2001). 
When arm’s length principle is used the importance of the determination of the comparability of the 
examined circumstances increases. OECD suggests five factors that are to be applied both to the 
controlled transaction and to the transaction between independent units. Among them there are the 
following: 
1) Characteristics of property or services (physical features, possible volume, quality; when the 
transaction deals with services – their nature, size; if the property is tangible we talk about such 
characteristics as licensing; type of property – patent, trademark, duration of protection; and it’s also 
important to take into account the possible benefits that the property can bring); 
2) Functional analysis (In the framework of the functional analysis it is to analyze the structure and 
the organization of the group, to find out the most important economic activities, allocated 
responsibilities, assets used and the possible risks. The thing that can help to identify the true 
allocation of risk can be a parties’ conduct); 
3) Contractual terms (the contractual terms usually «define explicitly or implicitly how the 
responsibilities, risks and benefits are to be divided between the parties»); 
4) Economic circumstances (It’s necessary to be sure that the markets where controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions are being proceeded do not have differences. Speaking more particularly it 
can be market’s location, its size, consumer purchasing power, the position of the buyers and sellers, 
level of supply and demand, cost of land, labor, capital, government regulation and so on. One of the 
most important factors is the existence of economic, business or product cycle); 
5) Business strategies (Among the business strategies that are to be developed in order to determine 
the comparability, there are such as “innovation and new product development, degree of 
diversification, risk aversion, assessment of political changes, input of existing and planned labor 
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laws, duration of arrangements”, market penetration schemes, duration of tax administration etc.) 
(OECD, 2010). 
2.6.2. Traditional transaction methods 
Generally traditional transaction methods are more preferable, however, they can be used only when 
there is enough information about the prices for transactions between independent parties in the 
comparable cases, where other factors can be examined through the determination of comparability 
(OECD, 2010). 
Traditional transaction methods help to determine whether the commercial and financial relations 
between the dependent parties are established in compliance with the arm’s length principle. The 
price of the uncontrolled comparable transaction can be easily put on the place of the price of the 
controlled transaction that ensures the existence of the arm’s length principle between the parties. 
There are three traditional transaction methods: 
1. Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP-method); 
2. Resale price method; 
3. Cost-plus method. 
2.6.2.1. Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP-method) 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price method is based on the comparison of the price of the controlled 
transaction with the price of a comparable uncontrolled transaction. This statement is used to 
compare the price of the transaction between affiliated parties with the price in an open market: 
“The CUP method compares the price charged for property or services transferred in a controlled 
transaction to the price charged for property or services transferred in a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction in comparable circumstances” (OECD 95). 
It is possible to outline the cases when the traditional transaction methods are to be used. 
 So-called internal comparable transactions, that means the transactions comparable to a 
controlled transaction, but carried out by a company with an independent party in comparable 
commercial and financial conditions; 
 Loan issue transactions. There is a number of databases, which provide information on specific 
transactions regarding loans or bond issue, and if the basic conditions coincide (the amount and 
the currency of the loan, term, interest rate, etc.), these transactions may be regarded as 
comparable; 
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 Transactions regarding trademark. Also, there are databases with information on the 
transactions for the provision of trademarks (mainly in the US and Canada, where the disclosure 
of such information in some cases is a must). Although trademarks (as well as any other 
intellectual property) initially are difficult to compare because of their uniqueness, though it 
gives a certain benchmark for comparison; 
 Deals with the goods which have official (exchange) quotations or reliable statistics (Simonov, 
2014). 
 Benchmarking that has been mentioned above is widely used in this method of transfer pricing. 
The best way to use CUP-methods «is under similar terms, in similar quantities and in a similar 
market» (ITI, 2010). For this purpose it is necessary to outline the factors that can me compared 
externally and internally. It is important to find out the internal and external basis for comparison 
before analyzing which features are incomparable as possible adjustments can influence the variables 
what can affect the results. 
Here is the reproduction of Bjerke illustration (Bjerke, 1997; p. 225) of the internal and external 
comparables in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. Internal and External comparables. Bjerke, 1997. 
Thus, depending on the situation studied it is possible to find data on comparable transactions and to 
apply the first method. 
2.6.2.2. Resale price method 
This method determines the transfer price by comparing gross profit margin of a controlled 
transaction with that of uncontrolled transaction or transactions. It is used to set the price at which 
one affiliated company sells goods or services to another affiliated company if the last one resales 
goods or services to one or more independent firms. 
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In this case the price is determined by the reseller regarding the profit margin that will cover the 
expenses and will still be in plus (the reseller will get some profit). The transactions should be held in 
the comparable commercial and financial conditions. The illustration of the use of the resale price 
method is given below in Figure 2.2 (Helland, 2010). 
 
Figure 2.2. The use of the resale price method. 
 
To find the gross profit margin it is necessary to compare a number of factors (ITI, 2010). 
Internal comparing: Resale price margin that one of the company of the group got in comparable 
controlled transaction 
External comparing: Resale price margin that “an arm’s length company” got in comparable 
uncontrolled transaction. 
The more comparable are the examined factors the more possibility that the resale price method will 
determine the true resale price (ITI, 2010). 
However, the resale price margin can be influenced by the reseller’s activities. The number of 
activities can vary a lot from case to case. For example, a reseller can just perform a role of a 
forwarding agent or can alone take all the risk related to the further realization of the goods or 
services such as advertising, marketing, distribution, guarantees and so on. If a reseller has a certain 
expertise in these activities the resale price can increase. In order to analyze to deal with this case in 
appropriate way a cost-plus method can be issued in order to complement the resale price method 
(OECD, 2010). 
It is worth mentioning that the logic of the resale price method and the cost-plus method is quite 
similar: it is necessary to compare the gross margin (in the case of the method of the resale price) and 
gross margin of costs (in the case of cost-plus method) which the company has received in the 
transaction with the affiliated party with a market gross profit margin that the independent parties 
received in the comparable transactions. 
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Whereas, the choice of the methods between the resale price method and the cost-plus method will 
depend on the stage of the value chain process occupied by the examined company and the 
independent party (Simonov, 2014). 
The resale price method and cost-plus methods are illustrated by Simonov and is reproduced in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3. The use of resale price and cost-plus method. Simonov, 2014. 
2.6.2.3. Cost-plus method 
Cost-plus method is a method that is used to determine the price at which the supplier sells the goods 
of a company's group. The price is determined by adding gross profit margin to the amount of seller’s 
costs that will allow him to receive the profits corresponding to the market conditions and the 
functions performed by the seller. 
The cost-plus method is supposed to be used mainly for transactions regarding provision of services, 
apart from transactions that involve intangible assets that have a significant impact on gross profit 
margin. This method is based on the sum of the direct and indirect costs of the supplier. To determine 
the settlement price of the controlled transaction for tax purposes the prime cost increases for the 
amount of profit margin, normal for this area of work. On the next page there is an illustration of the 
use of cost-plus method (Lemeskina, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.4. The use of the cost-plus method. 
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The main difficulty of this method is that as a rule, information on costs is a commercial secret, and 
foreign companies do not disclose information about its costs. 
Determination of costs. “Although it is true that an enterprise must cover its costs over a period of 
time to remain in business, those costs may not be the determinant of the appropriate profit in a 
specific case for any one year”. As costs have influence on the gross profit margin there is a need to 
examine them more thoroughly. 
The costs are grouped into three categories: 
1) Direct costs: for instance, raw materials; 
2) Indirect costs: for instance, repair and maintenance; 
3) Operating costs: for instance, selling, general and administrative (OECD, 2001). 
Moreover, it is important to apply a comparable mark up to a comparable cost basis. For this purpose, 
it is necessary to analyze the differences between controlled and uncontrolled transactions that can 
influence the mark up in order to make appropriate adjustments to the uncontrolled transactions. 
And another point of the accounting consistency. If there are differences in accounting practices in 
the controlled and uncontrolled transaction, special adjustments are to be made in order to be sure 
that the same type of costs are used in each case (OECD, 2010). 
In situations where it is impossible to ensure the comparability of financial statements for the purpose 
of calculating the gross profit margin, and comparability of definition for the purposes of taxation of 
income (profits, revenue) in the transactions, the parties of which are interdependent bodies, the 
profit split method and transactional net margin method are used (Lemeskina, 2012). 
2.6.3. Transactional profit methods 
Despite the fact that traditional transaction methods are found to be to be more preferable, there are 
cases when transactional profit methods are considered to be more adequate. Those are the cases 
when “each of the parties makes valuable and unique contributions in relation to the controlled 
transaction, or where the parties engage in highly integrated activities, may make a transactional 
profit split more appropriate than a one-sided method”, or when there is available reliable 
information (OECD,2010). 
The application of the arm’s length principle in the case of these methods changes comparing with 
the application regarding traditional transaction methods. According to paragraph 2.108 of Review of 
Comparability and of Profit Methods, OECD: “Arm’s length principle in the case of a transactional 
profit split method, it is based on an approximation of the division of profits that independent 
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enterprises would have expected to realize from engaging in the transaction(s)” (OECD, 2010). Still, 
they are only appropriate if they are in compliance with the Article 9 of the OECD model Tax 
Convention. 
There are two transactional profit methods: 
 Profit split method; 
 Transactional Net Margin Method. 
2.6.3.1. Profit split method 
It is known that when a company redistribute the income in favor of the parent company affiliated 
divisions hold up prices not only when they supply goods, but also when they forward various 
services, patents, licenses and "know-how". When this type of situation is encountered, to justify the 
application of transfer pricing it is recommended to use the method of profit distribution. 
Application of the profit split method is based on the calculation of gross margin (loss) from the 
affiliated companies marketing products that is later divided between them based on the actual 
contribution to the formation of the total profit. In practice, as a criteria for the distribution of profit it 
is possible to use the indicators of average number of employees or the amount of labor costs. 
The basis for the choice of the method of determination of the transfer price both by the taxpayer and 
the tax authority should take into account the advantages and the disadvantages of the examined 
methods, their compliance with the requirements, as well as the availability of the information on 
comparable transactions and companies. 
For example, in Russia, the Federal Law № 227-FZ makes it possible to conclude Advance Pricing 
Agreements for tax purposes between large taxpayers and tax authorities. The object of such 
agreements is to establish methods for determination of the transfer prices, which must include: 
sources of information on comparable companies, transactions, prices; Comparable objects; the 
procedure for making allowances; the calculations, determination of the gross profit margin. 
The fulfillment of the provisions of such an agreement by the taxpayer should facilitate the release 
from taxpayers’ liability (Lemeskina, 2012). 
Talking about the strengths, the profit split method can be the most appropriate method when both 
parties make unique and valuable contributions to the transaction. Moreover, this method can take 
into account “possibly unique, facts and circumstances of the associated enterprises that are not 
present in independent enterprises, while still constituting an arm’s length approach to the extent 
that it reflects what independent enterprises reasonably would have done if faced with the same 
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circumstances” (OECD, 2010). Furthermore, it evaluates all the parties that make any contribution to 
the transaction. 
 Despite its advantages, the profit split methods have some drawbacks; 
 It is quite difficult to apply this method as you can face obstacles trying to get information 
from foreign affiliates and analyze combined revenue and costs of all the parties participated 
in the transaction; 
 It is used quite seldom and is more considered to be a theoretical method; 
 It can be difficult to differentiate between transaction and the rest of the processes income, 
costs and property; 
 The method is used on a basis of historical data, not on the current one. It is always easier to 
analyze what has already happened (Bjerke, 1997). 
2.6.3.2. Transactional net margin method (TNMM) 
Profit comparison methods (TNMM/CPM) – methods of comparing profits. There are two varieties 
of this group of methods: Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) – net margin method and the 
Comparable Profits Method (CPM) – a method of profit comparison. The basis of these methods is 
the determination of the price based on the comparison of profit on the controlled transaction with a 
profit of independent businesses. 
This method allows us to neutralize the drawbacks by changing the price of the transaction's gross 
profit margin to the operating margin of the company. Depending on the circumstances, the different 
financial indicators can be used. A specific indicator is chosen in the way that better reflects the 
factor on which the profit depends. The algorithm of this method includes the following steps: 
 selection of the source of information; 
 functional analysis; 
 selection of the examined side; 
 choosing a financial indicator; 
 selection of comparable companies; 
 calculation of the market gross profit margin; 
 comparison of profit margin obtained by the test company, with a market gross profit margin 
(Simonov, 2014). 
  39 
Advantages and disadvantages of TNMM. 
Advantages: 
 Comparing this method with the CUP method, net profit indicators («e.g. return on assets, 
operating income to sales, and possibly other measures of net profit») are less influenced by 
the transactional differences, what’s more, these indicators are more tolerant to these 
mentioned differences; 
 Sometimes it is hard to get information on the operating expenses due to some problems with 
public data in some countries and the use of net profit margin can face this problem; 
 It is not necessary to analyze the financial statements of all the participants in the transaction 
unlike it is the case with the profit split method (OECD, 2010). 
The point 2.77, B.3.3 says that «only those items that (a) directly or indirectly relate to the controlled 
transaction at hand and (b) are of an operating nature should be taken into account in the 
determination of the net profit indicator for the application of the transactional net margin method». 
Disadvantages: 
 It’s difficult for taxpayers to apply the TNMM for controlled transaction when there is no 
reliable information on the uncontrolled transaction what impose obstacles on the forming the 
correct sample of the companies. 
For example, Russian Classification of the economic activities includes different types of activities 
that can not be compared one with another (Lemeskina, 2012).  
It is applied to only one of the affiliated parties that can give bias results due to the one-sided 
approach. 
The determination of the corresponding adjustment may impose some difficulties as there can appear 
uncertainty about which of the company’s profits of the group should be adjusted. 
2.7. Advance pricing agreements (APA) 
An advance pricing agreement, according to the OECD guidelines, is: “An arrangement that 
determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, 
comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time. An APA is 
formally initiated by a taxpayer and requires negotiations between the taxpayer, one or more 
associated enterprises, and one or more tax administrations. APAs are intended to supplement the 
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traditional administrative, judicial, and treaty mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing issues. They 
may be most useful when traditional mechanisms fail or are difficult to apply” (OECD, 2010). 
In particular, in Russia an Advance pricing agreement is an agreement between a great tax payer and 
tax authorities which defines the order of the determination of the transfer price and the method used 
in controlled transactions (Article 83 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation). 
This agreement helps to eliminate the risks tied to the supplement tax assessment that takes place 
when it comes to the transfer pricing rules. 
APAs clarify: 
 Transactions covered by the APA; 
 Transfer pricing method (TPM); 
 APA term; 
 Operational and compliance provisions; 
 Appropriate adjustments; 
 Critical assumptions regarding future events; 
 Required APA records; 
 Annual compliance reporting responsibility (Guide to Advance pricing agreements by EY, 
2015). 
Taxpayers can enter both Unilateral APAs - with one tax authority or with two and more tax 
authorities – bilateral or multilateral agreements through a mutual agreement procedure (MAP). If 
unilateral APAs help to eliminate the disputes that can emerge in a relation with one government, 
bilateral APAs address the risks regarding misunderstandings and differences in interpretation of the 
transfer pricing rules in different countries and the problem of double taxation (HM Revenue & 
Customes, 2016). 
Furthermore, APAs can be a way of time and costs savings. If a procedure of transfer pricing 
examinations can take up to three-four years that could be followed by a dispute resolution 
mechanism, the APA process lasts considerably less time and costs less. 
If a taxpayer decides to enroll the APA process, there are several steps that have to be followed: 
 Prefilling conference; 
 Formal APA request; 
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 Evaluation and negotiation; 
 Administration and renewal (EY, 2016). 
Ernest and Young provides an illustration of the bilateral APA process. It is presented in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5. APA process: bilateral APA timeline. EY, 2011. 
A taxpayer should request a prefilling conference (PFC). During this conference a taxpayer explains 
the suitability of his request and clarify the information required by the tax authority. In some states, 
a taxpayer can remain anonymous. 
APAs are used in many countries around the world. Thus, in Japan in 2010 the local tax authorities 
received 127 requests from the taxpayers. And as a result of consideration 100 APAs were concluded 
(paragraph 3.10.1 chapter 3 UN Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries). 
2.8. Benchmarking 
Another phenomenon that is to be mentioned in the study of transfer pricing is benchmarking. Why is 
it used? 
Benchmarking is one of the tools that helps to identify Comparable Uncontrolled Price that is used to 
identify the transfer price between the affiliated parties in the controlled transaction. Companies do 
use benchmarks in order to find the comparable uncontrolled price to make their prices be in 
compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
There are many definitions of the benchmarking nowadays, however, in general, benchmarking is the 
process through which a company measures its products, services, and practices against its toughest 
competitors, or those companies recognized as leaders in its industry. Benchmarking is one of a 
manager's best tools for determining whether the company is performing particular functions and 
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activities efficiently, whether its costs are in line with those of competitors, and whether its internal 
activities and business processes need improvement (Reference for Business, 2016). 
As it is possible to see from the definition, one of the main purpose of the benchmarking is the 
increase of the company’s performance. In order to do it, it is possible to use the benchmarking wheel 
suggested by Bjorn Andersen which illustrates the way the strengths of the benchmarking should be 
used. 
There are several classifications of the benchmarking. The first one, is based on the examined areas 
suggested by Løvland. According to him benchmarking can me internal, external and generic 
(Løvland, 2001). Another classification has a process as a background for the comparison: 
performance, process and strategic benchmarking. Nowadays, this last classification is considered to 
be more relevant than the first one. 
Concerning, the benchmarking used in Transfer pricing, it is possible to quote, the Transfer Pricing 
Benchmarking Review that PWC suggests. According to their experience it helps to analyze whether 
the current transfer pricing system of a company is appropriate and determine the range of arm’s 
length prices that a company can take as transfer pricing within the company for controlled 
transactions between the affiliated parties. 
According to the PWC, the Transfer Pricing Benchmarking Review can be beneficial for a company 
in several ways: 
 mitigate the transfer pricing risks if the determined prices for the controlled transaction are in 
compliance with the arm's length principle; 
 minimize tax exposure through the benchmarking study and penalty through good 
cooperation in the case that a tax adjustment is unavoidable; 
 effectively gauge company performance against comparable independent companies in a 
comparable industry; 
 establish appropriate transfer pricing for new business (PWC, 2016). 
Thus, benchmarking is an important tool in the determination of the transfer pricing policy of 
the company that helps it to operate in compliance with the arm’s length principle and achieve and 
maintain company’s competitiveness. 
The provided above theory and concepts enabled be to make a robust theoretical framework for 
my research. The examined international guidelines helped me to elaborate methodology that will 
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examine the way international practices are incorporated in Russia and answer the research question- 
how is transfer pricing defined in Russian oil and gas sector. 
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3. Methodological chapter. 
The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze transfer pricing in oil and gas sector in Russia. 
The information received from the advisors, insiders and legislative documents is supposed to 
compel one another and provide a complex overview of the current situation from a triangle 
perspective. 
3.1. Research methodology 
Methodology is defined in the dictionary as a «sum of methods and strategies that are applied for 
manipulating of the collected data and acquiring knowledge» (Jary and Jary, 1995). Philosophical 
background is essential not only to explain the choice of certain methods used to carry out the survey, 
but it forms the methodology of any research.  In order to have all the elements of the research 
project in compliance with each other and have a strong correlation among them everything should 
be made through philosophical prism. A certain philosophical position, according to Easterby-Smith 
(2012, p.17), is a «determinant factor for choosing and adapting a proper research design». 
The philosophical ground for the research project consists of ontology and epistemology. Ontology 
defines “philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality” while epistemology is focused on 
“the ways of inquiring into the nature of the world” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jakson, 2012, p.18). 
In this research, I would like the ontological background of my work to be relativistic. Relativists 
state that there are many «truths» and that the facts depend on viewpoint of observer (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 2012, p.19). Moreover, they argue that there may never be a definitive 
answer to the debate and that the truth is only achieved through discussion. Thus, an observer should 
study the examined through the multiple personal opinion on the problem. The aim of this research 
project is to find out how does the transfer pricing defined in the oil and gas sector in Russia. 
However, the actors that are to be examined have different views on the studied topic: advisors have 
external view on the transfer pricing situation in companies, the companies' managers have insider 
view on the subject and the tax authorities, as a regulation body, has their own approach towards the 
issue. Thus, through the comparison of these three opinions and finding the points of coincidence it is 
possible to find the truth about the definition of the transfer pricing in oil and gas sector in Russia. 
As for epistemological dimension, I am inclined to follow social constructionist approach. In the 
“Management research” in relation to social constructionism (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 
2012, p.23) states that “reality is determined by people”, not the external influence and objective 
factors. In this research the emphasis is put on how an individual evaluates and thinks about his/her 
experience rather than on facts and measurements. Social constructionism better suit in this case as it 
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is aimed at increase of general understanding of the situation, it can include the overview of the 
'whole' situation. Moreover, it accepts the value of multiple data sources, as in this research there is a 
need to get primary data, in particular, through questionnaires and in-depth interviews and to analyze 
secondary data in order to find out the description of transfer pricing in Russia. And the research does 
not have a great number of cases that is why the constructionist approach that enables the 
generalizations beyond the sample better suits the research. 
3.2. Research design 
According to explanation provided in “Management research” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 
2012, p.38), research design is supposed to define what data needed to be collected, in what way a 
researcher is going to get it and the sources of it. Moreover, research design explains in what way and 
with the help of which tools the collected data will be interpreted and how the answer to the 
formulated question will be provided. In compliance with the relativism ontology that is at the core of 
my study and the constructionist approach chosen as a way to investigate the nature of the issue, I 
will apply a constructivist design that implies cases and surveys. 
This type of methods will help to compare the way people interpret, understand, view the facts and at 
the same time estimate how respondents describe their experience and focus on their «self-generated 
meanings» (Flick, 2014, p.204). For example, the analysis of the questionnaires will explain how the 
advisers view the situation concerning, transfer pricing practices in oil and gas sector in Russia. And 
the study of interviews from the insiders will deeper inside of the situation where they will share their 
experience and prescribe self-generated meanings to the observed issues. 
As a result of the in-depth interviews the elaborated and broad answers to the several groups of 
questions were collected: the questions were about the organizational structure, transfer pricing 
methods used in the company, decision-making, out of company’s activities concerning transfer 
prices, etc. 
Questionnaires consist of following questions: the organization structure of the companies, transfer 
pricing methods used, how international practices are taken into account, decisions related to transfer 
pricing practices and so on. However, compared to the interviews, not all the questions in the 
questionnaires are open-ended, some of them implies short answers or allocation of percentages. 
Still, it is easy to see the reflection of these examined issues in those studied through the interview. 
Data obtained thorough the study of the legislation, rules, recommendations issued by tax authorities 
was collected and studied in order to understand and interpret their approach to transfer pricing. 
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The performance of the gathered data and its type is influenced a lot by the place and the role of the 
researcher in the process, to what extent he or she is going to be involved into the observed issue 
(Flick, 2014, p.24). Mostly, within the study process I tackle the issue independently, however, the 
collection of the primary data needs a bit more involvement into the process. 
3.3. Data collection 
The elaborated and well-considered strategy for data collection is another important moment that 
helps to find out the answers for the posed research questions. There are two types of data that is to 
be used in this paper – primary data and secondary data. Secondary data – the existent relevant 
information will allow to make a sufficient theoretical base and framework for further gathering of 
the primary data. 
In this work, I include the analysis of the written material upon current situation regarding transfer 
pricing in Russia helped to find out current trend and the particular features of the reflection of 
transfer pricing on oil and gas sector that helps to formulate better and suitable questions for 
questionnaire and interview guide. Moreover, I will use the secondary data in order to analyze how 
the tax authorities approach the transfer pricing and what they understand by transfer pricing. 
Still, secondary data is not sufficient to find the answer for the posed questions and analyze the 
current trends. Moreover, it is rather difficult to be sure in the credibility and the validity of the 
information as its value can decrease as the time passes. However, the access to this type of 
information is much easier than to the primary one, it is rather cheap and can be gathered by a single 
researcher. In addition to this, the secondary data provides the ground work for the study, it shows 
the level to which the topic is examined, the moments that have not been studied, the weak points and 
the possible ways to extent the field. 
The primary data is to be gathered to complement the information gathered through the analysis of 
the secondary data. My primary data set includes 12 questionnaires and two in-depth interviews. It 
enabled me to find out the verification of the most current and recent trends, the attitudes and beliefs 
of the respondents upon the examined topic, to reveal possible obscure moments that can not be 
discovered through the analysis of the existent information, the real processes undergoing in oil and 
gas sphere. This received data helps to study the subject in more details. Among other advantages of 
this type of data there are: validity, new current information and one of the most important points is 
that it is gathered in accordance with the goals of the research project, and the research model was 
designed exactly to meet the needs of this particular study. For the sample of this research 12 experts 
from audit Big 4 firms have been chosen and 2 managers from the oil and gas companies. 
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3.3.1. Methodology for the Russian Transfer Pricing tax base study 
In order to gather the relevant information about the tax authorities approach to transfer pricing and 
what do they mean/understand by transfer pricing, there is a need to structure the further search for 
information. It is important that the examining in the documents issues be in line with those issues 
that are intended to be found out with the help of interviews and questionnaires in order to consider 
upon one another in the analytical chapter and describe how the laws, rules and recommendations 
reflected in the business practices. 
For this purpose there is a need to answer the following questions: 
4. What were the initial aims of tax authorities when they introduced the new rules? 
5. What are the main documents regarding Transfer pricing regulation? 
6. How are interdependent persons determined in the Russian legislative system? 
7. What transactions are to be studied? 
8. How do Russian tax authorities incorporate international practices, international guidelines 
(OECD recommendations and guidelines)? 
9. What is written about the use of transfer pricing methods? 
10. Which cases are selected? 
11. What is the procedure of the information disclosure? (the procedure of the documentation of the 
controlled transactions) 
12. What are the Advance pricing agreements in Russia? 
To find answers to these questions the Russian legislative and regulatory acts, Tax Code of the 
Russian Federation, amendments to the Tax Code, letters and clarifications provided by the Ministry 
of Finance of the Russian Federation, Federal Tax Service, regarding the use of Transfer Pricing rules 
were thoroughly examined. The documents were accessed via online database like “Consultant” that 
unites all the legislative acts that were introduced and amendments to them, as well as the resources 
provided by the Ministry of Finance of Russian Federation as governmental acts and clarification 
letters that are also available online. 
3.3.2. In-depth interviews 
According to the intended study, the interview-guide consists of questions that were made in line 
with the theoretical framework and the research design. However, the pilot study was needed in order 
to avoid the possible misunderstandings and the inaccuracy of the stated questions. 
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I made a pivotal study to fix and adjust the questions and make them respondent friendly. In order to 
conduct it I asked a manager who used to work in oil and gas sector but quit this job several months 
ago. At the pivotal interview I found out that the managers can not be aware of the arm’s length 
yielded transfer pricing methods that is why I provided an explanation to all these methods during the 
further interviews. Moreover, I put some examples to the questions related to the organizational 
structure when the managers were asked to identify the level of diversification of the company or 
parts of the value chain process. This helped me to eliminate the ambiguity of the interpretation. 
It showed which terms are difficult to comprehend. Moreover, some obscure points were revealed 
which needed more sub-questions to be stated. The final version of the interview guide reflects the 
aims of the study, incorporate all the details, is elaborated enough and consider the deficiencies 
revealed at the pivotal stage. 
 The final variant of the interview guide comprises 22 open questions that are divided into 
several groups: 
 Organizational structure of the company; 
 transfer pricing methods used in the company; 
 how are international practices taken into account; 
 decision-making regarding transfer pricing issues; 
 external activities concerning Transfer pricing; 
 recommendations. 
The interview guide was semi-structured and in-depth in order to get more insider information about 
the transfer pricing system and to let the respondents share their experience and extra thoughts on the 
topic that can be relevant, and so it will suggest an idea for further research. The interview guide is 
attached in the Appendix 2. 
As for respondents, two top managers dealing with transfer pricing issues from the Russian oil and 
gas companies have been chosen. Such a choice has been made, to get valid in-depth information. 
One of the managers was found via LinkedIn and was asked to participate in the interview about 
Transfer pricing practices in the company he worked (expert A). He agreed to give an interview by 
phone due to the time shortage and the interview lasted approximately 10-15 minutes. Though the 
interview was not long I was able to get a deep insight into the acutest issues, in particular concerning 
the communication with the authorities regarding transfer pricing policy. 
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The manager from company B was giving us a master class. I contacted him via e-mail asking 
whether he would agree to participate in the interview concerning transfer pricing practices in his 
company. It was a face-to-face interview that lasted about 40 minutes and gave me an opportunity to 
get a big amount of data covering all the managerial aspects of transfer pricing in the company. 
3.3.3. Questionnaires 
There are 21 questions in the elaborated questionnaire. They are grouped into several categories. 
Those related to the Appendix 1: 
 organizational structure of the company (level of vertical integration, level of diversification, 
level of centralization) 
 transfer pricing methods used (traditional or transactional profit methods, questions about 
APAs); 
 how are international practices taken into account (OECD guidelines, use of international 
experience); 
 decisions related to the transfer pricing practices (who is responsible for decisions – top 
management or unit management); 
 motivations for the use of transfer pricing for the oil and gas companies (purposes of use of 
advisory assistance; 
 preparation of the transfer pricing documentation (what is the advisors’ attitude to the current 
situation in relation to TP); 
 interaction between TP advisory and the company. 
As it is possible to notice there is a strong correlation between the groups of questions provided in the 
interview guide and in the questionnaire. They reflect each other and have a lot in common. This 
positioning helps to get different views (external and internal) on the same problem. 
Talking about the sample, there have been chosen 12 advisors from the Big 4 company from tax 
departments that deal with transfer pricing issues or from the relevant ones. The respondents were 
informed that all the stated questions are related to the oil and gas industry. However, some people 
may argue that 12 responses are not enough for the quantitative study but too many for the qualitative 
one. Despite this fact, the validity to the carried out research is brought by the advisors themselves. 
They work with many companies and have a lot of experience in the particular field. In contrasts with 
the managers that have been chosen for receiving insider information who mostly work for one 
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company and have constrained experience, the advisors have an overview of the situation as a whole 
by assisting variety of organization of the examined field. Another strength of asking consultants 
from the Big 4 is that they are familiar with all the concepts and terminology as they tend to have 
better knowledge of transfer pricing in general and their answers are less biased when it comes to the 
transfer pricing practices observed. Thus, the answers are probably more objective than if the firms 
are examined directly. Still they do not have such an insight into the company’s operations as its 
employees do. That is why the answers will compel one another. 
There are different types of them that help to gather the desired information. I have made a focus not 
on the closed questions but on a   semi-opened questions where a respondent has an ability to allocate 
a certain amount of percentages he/she thinks the listed variants deserve. If the right answer is not 
available a respondent can tick the box other and add his own variant ascribing a number of 
percentiles.  
Such a questionnaire unlike in-depth interview requires not only less time and money resources, but 
also enables to receive answers from greater amount of respondents. 
3.4. Limitations of the research 
It is highly important to pay attention to the possible limitations of the research. For this particular 
research project, it is necessary to mention the limitations tied to the data collection. This project 
implies the analysis of the legislative documents, interviews and questionnaires. It is obvious that the 
obtained data will vary. 
On the one hand, the information received from the one source will be compelled with the 
information from another one, however, for this paper some questions that can be posed to the 
consultants and managers can not be answered by the study and the analysis of the legislative 
documents. For this purpose, there is a need to address the representatives of the regulation 
authorities. To search for the information in the written material is not enough to face this issue. 
3.5. Validity, reliability and ethical issues 
For any research project validity and reliability of data are highly important. The data needs to be 
true and accurate. When the research implies quantifiable parameters it is easy to check the data but 
when it comes to the personal feelings and beliefs its far more difficult task. 
As for constructionist design it’s difficult to indicate its quality. Although the results that have been 
gathered should be valuable and be conducted through transparent methods. Therefore, its vital to 
explain how the data was created, interpreted, how the sample was chosen (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, 
Jackson, 2013, p.54). 
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The authors suggest to think of that question in order to increase the validity: “Have a sufficient 
number of perspectives been included” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 2012, p.71) 
In my research project in order to find out “How the transfer pricing is defined in oil and gas sector 
in Russia?” I decided to look at the problem from a triangle perspective: 
 the approach of the authorities through the analysis of the legislative documents; 
 the external point view to the problem with a help of questionnaires filled in by the 
consultants; 
 the point of view of the insiders with a help of interviews with managers from oil and gas 
companies. 
Here it is important also to talk about the number of cases selected: 
For the first part – the analysis of the legislative documents concerning transfer pricing practices was 
carried out. The cases were selected according to the posed questions. 
For the second part – 12 consultants have been chosen, 3 from each company of the Big 4. Though 
some people may argue that 12 respondents are not enough for a quantitive research I would say that 
the consultants work with different companies from the sector consequently they have enough 
experience that cover many situations. That is why the data received from them will be valuable. 
For the third part – two managers from different oil and gas companies have been chosen – one a 
state one and another a private one. That part of the research project is qualitative, thus it was 
important gather deeper insight from the experts who were actually chosen. They provided valuable 
data as both of them are professionals with a great experience in the relevant sphere though at the 
same time presenting private and state public sector what is also important. 
As for external and internal validity it is possible to apply to Cook and Campbell 1979 work. The 
internal validity “refers to the approximate validity with which we infer that a relationship between 
two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the absence of cause” (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979, p.37). In my research design it could be achieved through explanation buildings. 
And the external validity “refers to the approximate validity with which we can infer that the 
presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and 
effect and across different types of persons, settings, and times” (Cook and Campbell, 1979, p.37). 
Concerning the external validity of my research project, it is reached by the applicability of the 
empirical data regarding some statistics on transfer pricing practices. 
In order to verify the reliability of data it is necessary to answer the following question: 
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“Will similar observations be reached by other observers?” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, 2012, 
p.71). The reliability is achieved with a help of conformity of the empirical data to research questions 
through the procedures that can be later repeat and lead to the same results. In this research project it 
is described in details how the data was gathered with a help of what tools, consequently other 
observers suppose to achieve the same results if they follow the presented procedure and techniques. 
The ethical issues of the research project are also to be discussed. Here it is important to protect the 
interests of individuals/organizations involved into the research project.  As transfer pricing is a lot 
about possible ways to minimize tax base within legal framework for companies and for governments 
this minimization of tax base means the decrease of budget revenues consequently companies are not 
willing to disclose insider information about transfer pricing policies.  That is why it is highly 
important to be sure that the information received state confidential and persons involved remain 
unknown. Especially when it comes to the managers of the company it is important not to reveal even 
the name of the companies. All these recommendations I tried to follow in my research project and 
left the individuals anonymous. 
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4. Empirical chapter. Data analysis 
4.1. Tax authorities’ view 
In the empirical part of this paper, I will start with the description of the legislation, rules, 
regulations, recommendations issued by tax authorities. It is structured in accordance with the 
questions posed in the methodological part of this paper: 
In Russia as in many other countries it has become popular among the companies to minimize taxes 
by manipulating the prices of goods and services in transactions between affiliated or dependent units 
(controlled transactions). Among the possible ways to minimize the taxes it is possible to name: a 
registration of the conduit companies in jurisdictions with low or nonexistent taxes, a use of "one-day 
firms", concluding service and license agreements with no commercial reasonability, and generating 
losses for the company for tax purposes. The basis of minimization of taxes is the use of the 
transaction price that deviates from the price which would have been applied by independent parties 
who are not bound by relations of equity, common control or other relations that can influence 
economic performance and (or) the conditions and the results of the transactions (Clarification letter 
of Federal Tax Service of Russia, 2013). 
The ensuring the counteractions to the use of transfer pricing in order to minimize taxes by affiliated 
companies is an important issue for Russia. In this regard, the main purpose of the law is the 
harmonization and the increase of the efficiency of tax control over the correctness of the calculation. 
As well as the control over the full payment of taxes in the cases of transfer pricing application, 
specification of the list of the affiliated parties and improvement of the foundations for the price 
determination in the controlled transactions. 
The bill can be applied by tax authorities to the organizations and individuals carrying out controlled 
transactions, defined by the bill. 
The main legal act that describes the transfer pricing issue in Russia is the Tax Code of the Russian 
Federation. The new measures of tax control for transfer pricing were put into effect in Russia on the 
January 1st, 2012 by the Federal Law № 227-FZ. There are also letters and clarifications provided by 
the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and the Federal Tax Service, however, they are not 
considered as normative legislative acts and are not binding on taxpayers, just on tax authorities. 
Section V.1 of the Russian Tax Code, Chapter 14.1 describes the procedure for determining the 
participating interest held by one organization in another organization or held by a physical person in 
an organization. Article 105.1, Chapter 14.1, Section V.1 of the Russian Tax Code defines 
interdependent persons in the following way: 
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“Where specific factors in relations between particular persons may exert an influence on the 
conditions and (or) results of transactions concluded by those persons and (or) the economic results 
of activities of those persons or activities of persons represented by them, the persons referred to in 
this clause shall be deemed to be interdependent for taxation purposes (hereinafter referred to as 
“interdependent persons”)” (Tax Code of the Russian Federation, 1998). 
After the general definition there are more detailed explanations for the determination of the 
interdependent persons. 
The transactions that should be supervised by the tax authorities are called “controlled transactions” 
and are being determined in the Article 105.14 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation. The 
purpose of this control is that the regulation authority is in power to compare the prices established 
by the parties with the market prices, and if they differ from the market prices to assess additional tax 
liabilities on the basis of the market price. It is worth mentioning that rather small number of 
taxpayers have been in the list of the controlled transactions since 2012. According to Russian 
transfer pricing legislation among controlled transactions there are: 
 Any transactions between affiliated foreign persons (both legal entities and individuals). This 
type of transaction is being supervised regardless of the deal value; 
 External transactions of goods of international exchange trade; 
 Transactions in the area of foreign trade in goods traded in global exchange trading; 
 Transactions with the “offshore states”; 
 Transactions between Russian interdependent tax payers are determined to be controlled only 
when the deal value exceeds the established monetary limit (art.105.14 Tax Code of Russian 
Federation). 
This limit still remains rather high though it has been reduced. In 2012 – three billion rubles, in 2013 
– two billion rubles and since 2013 – one billion rubles. The detailed clarification is provided by the 
Federal Tax Service on the information about the controlled transactions (FTS, 2016). 
Lower limits are established for certain special cases: 
 Minerals extraction transactions, if one of the parties is a taxpayer of the tax on mineral 
extraction calculated at the rate specified in percentage (if the amount of income from 
transactions between these bodies exceeds 60 million rubles during the same calendar year); 
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 Transactions when taxpayers applying the taxation system for agricultural producers (unified 
agricultural tax) or tax system as a single tax on imputed income for certain types of activity 
(if the relevant transaction is carried out within the framework of such activities) (if the 
amount of income from transactions between these parties for the calendar year exceeds 100 
million rubles); 
 Transactions when an organization is exempt from the taxpayer's income tax obligations of 
organizations or applies to the tax base for this tax a tax rate of 0 per cent in accordance with 
paragraph 5.1 of Article 284 of the Tax Code (if the amount of income from transactions 
between these parties for the calendar year exceeds 60 million rubles). This category includes 
transactions with taxpayers applying the simplified tax system (STS); 
 Transactions regarding a resident of the special economic zone where the tax regime, which 
provides special benefits for corporate profits (compared to the general tax regime in the 
corresponding subject of the Russian Federation) (if the amount of income from transactions 
between these entities exceeds 60 million rubles during the same calendar year). 
It should be noted that in the case of the transaction where there is no chargeable consideration, the 
Tax Code establishes the requirement to determine the tax base from the market prices, with 
reference to Article 105.3. This means that the tax authorities are to check the accuracy of 
determination of the tax base for transaction where there is no chargeable consideration according to 
the rules established for the controlled transactions. 
Russian tax authorities try to use successful international practices. It is important to mention that the 
OECD guidelines are not considered to be normative legislative acts in Russia and are not binding on 
tax payers nor on tax authorities. However, some of the statutes of OECD guidelines are 
implemented in Russian transfer pricing legislation. 
The Russian Federation being an observer of OECD and a candidate to join the organization, by 
adding to the existent tax regulation has legally confirmed the use of the transfer pricing methods 
proposed by the OECD in the transfer pricing regulation process. However, there is no official 
division of these methods into traditional transaction methods and transaction profit methods. 
Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation tries to incorporate the OECD guidelines. For 
example, the selection of cases that can be examined is in accordance with the UN Practical Transfer 
Pricing Manual for Developing Countries. The UN Practical Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing 
Countries Article 4.4.3.4., chapter 4, October 2012 outlines the factors that tax authorities of different 
countries use while choosing the company for the tax control regarding the question of transfer 
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pricing. In Russia, there is a practice of the risk analysis when the tax authorities choose the 
outstanding cases for the study. Among these cases there are those when an organization: 
 “Reported losses for a number of years or more, especially if the losses begin about the time 
when a “tax holiday” runs out; 
 A high value of related party transactions compared to the taxpayer’s turnover and operating 
profit; 
 Significant transactions with major counterparts from low or no-tax jurisdictions, non-treaty 
partners and countries which don’t participate in the agreements on the exchange of 
information between tax authorities; 
 an economically unrealistic profit trend compared to the industry trend, with no obvious 
explanation; 
 inconsistencies between inter-company contracts, transfer pricing policies and detailed 
transactional documents such as invoices and customs documents; or 
 significant royalty payments to related parties, especially if the intellectual property is not 
legally registered or appears to be in some part locally generated”. 
However, it is important to mention that OECD guidelines can be used by tax authorities while 
selecting the cases but they are not legally confirmed by the Russian Tax Code. Russia is not a 
member of OECD and is not bound to follow the OECD guidelines. Still tax authorities are trying to 
incorporate successful international experience into the Russian legislation. 
Taxpayer shall be obliged to notify tax authorities of controlled transactions which they concluded in 
a calendar year not later than May 20 of the year following the calendar year in which controlled 
transactions were concluded. Also the taxpayer at the request of the tax authority is required to 
provide documentation regarding the concrete homogeneous transaction (group of similar 
transactions) in the manner prescribed by paragraph 1, Article 105.15 of the Tax Code. 
According to the legislative acts, the 1st of June of the year following the calendar year in which the 
controlled transaction occurred - the date on which the tax authorities have the right to request 
documentation regarding a specific transaction or a group of similar transactions (paragraph 3, 
Article 105.15 of the Tax Code). 
Federal Tax Service recommends stages of preparation of documentation regarding controlled 
transactions (FTS, 2016). They are provided in the Table 4.1. 
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Stage Title Procedure 
1 
Identification and 
analysis of controlled 
transactions 
The identification of controlled transactions in 
accordance with the terms of recognition of transactions 
controlled from the provisions of Art. 105.14 of the Tax 
Code. 
2 
Planning and definition 
of the intended volume 
of documentation and 
the time for its 
preparation 
Assess the amount of future income tax liabilities, costs 
of organizing documentation and advantages in preparing 
the proper documentation. 
3 
Description of the main 
characteristics of the 
scope (type of) those 
activities committed 
controlled transaction 
The features of the goods (works, services) that are 
subject to a controlled transaction (group of similar 
transactions) are identified and their classification with a 
view to assessing the possibility of a potential 
comparison with homogeneous (identical) goods (works, 
services) is carried out. 
4 
Comparability of the 
commercial and (or) the 
financial terms of 
transactions and 
functional analysis 
Analysis of the rights and obligations of the parties to the 
controlled transaction (regulated by Article 105.5 Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation) 
5 
Description of the 
parties involved in the 
transaction, and the 
selection of the test side 
of a controlled 
transaction 
Based on the functional analysis of the decision on the 
choice of the tested party transactions analyzed for 
economic analysis. 
6 
The choice of pricing 
method 
The selection of method (combination of methods) for 
determining for the purposes of taxation of income 
(profits, revenue) in the transactions the parties of which 
are interdependent persons, in accordance with paragraph 
1, Article 105.7 of the Tax Code is carried out. 
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7 Economic analysis 
Searching for comparable transactions and comparable 
companies (depending on the chosen method) and 
calculation of market price interval (interval of 
profitability). Based on the results of the study 
determined matching price (profitability) in the analyzed 
interval transaction market price or profitability. 
8 Documenting 
The decision of the organization starts the process of 
preparation of documentation. The decision on the 
preparation of the documentation on the project basis 





In order to ensure the stability of the application of the 
selected methodology for the controlled transaction and 
the relevance of the information provided, the 
documentation should be reviewed on an annual basis, 
which also implied the initiation of a special process. 
 
Table 4.1. Stages of the preparation of documentation in the Russian Federation 
The procedure of tax control in connection with the conclusion of transactions between 
interdependent persons by tax authorities is regulated by Art. 105.17 of the Tax Code. 
As it has already been mentioned above, in Russia an Advance pricing agreement is an agreement 
between a great tax payer and tax authorities that helps to agree upon the way the transfer price is 
determined. As well as the transfer pricing method used for tax assessment purposes in cases with 
particular controlled transactions, comprising the cases before the transactions are carried out. It 
helps to minimize the number of possible disputable points regarding the price determination for tax 
assessment purposes. (Article 83, the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, 1998). 
There is a list of documents that a taxpayer has to submit in order to have his request for the 
conclusion of the advance pricing agreements be examined. However, before the submission, a 
taxpayer can request a prefilling conference with tax authorities (PFC). The PFC helps to analyze the 
suitability of the request, to decrease the time period of the consideration of the request, to clarify the 
content of the documents needed. During this conference, a taxpayer in the oral or in the form of 
presentation can explain: 
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1) the nature and the factual circumstances of the controlled transaction that can become a subject 
of the agreement; 
2) the description of the business activities of the parties of the controlled transaction, the tax 
residents of which states they are, whether the parties are affiliated persons, the nature of the 
affiliation; 
3) the assumed methodology for price determination for the tax assessment purposes, sources of 
information and other data that is considered to be provided by the taxpayer (Recommendations of 
Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, 2012). 
Advance pricing agreement can be concluded for one or several transactions that have the same 
subject for the time that does not exceed three-year period. Though this period can be prolonged with 
a request (Article 105.21 the Tax Code of the Russian Federation). It is possible to observe, that 
Russian Transfer pricing rules have a lot in common with the international standards recognized by 
OECD. However, the illustration of the APAs process provided by Federal Tax Service of the 
Russian Federation shows that Russian transfer pricing system has its own features that have to be 
taken into account during the analysis. 
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Figure 4.1. The process of consideration of the projects on Advance pricing agreements. (Federal Tax Service of Russia), 
2016. 
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4.2. Consultants’ view 
As a result of the sending out of questionnaires, 12 answers have been received. Among the 
respondents there were representatives of the Big 4 that have a sophisticated experience in tax issues, 
particularly, in transfer pricing. The received answers are supposed to provide external view on the 
transfer pricing issues in oil and gas sector in Russia. The respondents were informed that all the 
questioned is related to the Russian oil and gas industry and is to be answered in accordance. The 
detailed answers are provided in Appendix 3. 
The first group of question was about the organizational structure of the company (level of vertical 
integration, level of diversification, level of centralization). 
 
Figure 4.2. The level of the vertical integration in the company. 
This chart illustrates how many parts of the value chain process is typical for Russian oil and gas 
companies. As we can see most corporations possess more than two components (53,8% as average) 
in other words they can have production, distribution, resale and so on. From the well-head up to the 
customer (Rosneft, Gazpromneft). 
However, the question about the level of diversification showed that most of the companies are 
present in two industries (43% average allocated to this item) that means that they are highly 
specified and try to concentrate their business and resources in one sector. On the one hand such a 
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concentration enables the faster development of the one particular sector, on the other hand such state 
of affairs can lead to the downturn of the other sectors of Russian economy and to the Dutch decease, 
where the mis-management of the profits received from the oil industry leads to the under 
investments in other sectors of economy. 
Talking about the level of the centralization of the Russian oil and gas companies, most of the 
consultants allocated the biggest amount of percentages to the “Operational decisions are made by 
central management” – 53,8%, “Operational decisions are made both by central and unit 
management” – 29%, “Operational decisions are made by unit management” – 18%. This means that 
either they are not aware of the day to day operations made by the unit managements or they consider 
the Russian oil and gas sector to be highly centralized with the decisions imposed by the top 
management. If we have a closer look at the allocation of the percentages by each respondent, it is 
possible to see that half of the respondents allocated 70% and more to the “operational decisions are 
made by central management”. 
The second group of question deals with the transfer pricing methods used by the companies. 
According to the results, among the yielded from the arm’s length principle, companies use all the 
listed methods, but the leader is the cost-plus method and comparable uncontrolled price method and 
transactional net margin method share the second position (31,7% and 28,3% consequently). 
About the Arm’s length principle, 75% of the respondents answered that it is often used in relation to 
transfer pricing, 25% that sometimes and none of the consultants stated that it is seldom used. 
In the question about the concluded Advance pricing agreements the opinions of the respondents 
vary. At average, the equal amount of percentages is allocated to “two-four” and “more than four” oil 
and gas companies have this type of agreements. 
The next section is about the international practices and how they are taken into account. 
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Figure 4.3. The frequency of the use of Transfer pricing methods in compliance with the OECD standards by companies.  
Even though companies use the methods in accordance with the OECD recommendations, at first 
they are bound to the Russian tax legislation what can be proved by the consultants’ answers 91,7% 
of whom pointed Russian legislative system on the first place and only 8,3% noted that oil and gas 
companies try to keep to the both systems. 
If we get deeper into the international practices that oil and gas companies can use as examples while 
elaborating their transfer pricing system, the respondents named such countries as US, Europe, 
OECD countries, where US encounters 5 times out of 12, Europe 7 times out of 12 and UK 
separately 6 times. 
Continuing the topic of the OECD guidelines the consultants were asked to say whether they know 
any OECD guidelines that are still negligible in Russia, but should be introduced in order to improve 
the transfer price settlement. Some of the respondents pointed out that some “principals of 
application of transfer pricing (TP) rules for loan agreements, adjustments” or “loan agreements” 
can contribute the development of the system, part of the consultants wonder what OECD guidelines 
can improve the system and others say that any as long as they “comply with the Russian TP 
legislation” or “Various provisions of OECD TP Guidelines can be introduced by Russian 
companies, though they would not be able to appeal to them in disputes with tax authorities, since 
OECD TP Guidelines are not implemented in Russian TP legislation”. So, the problem is that many 
guidelines can be introduced, but they are to be implemented into the Russian Transfer pricing 
legislation. 
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During the analysis of the decisions related to the transfer pricing practices it has been studied that, 
according to the audit employees the central management that is up to 73,8% is responsible for the 
choice of the Transfer pricing policy and only 16,7% of the responsibility belongs to the central and 
unit management. Similar situation is with the settlement of the transfer price 71,7% and 15,4% 
consequently. However, in the question of transfer price the respondents gave a little bit more powers 
to the unit management 12,1% and 8,8 % consequently. 
It is also necessary to study the motivations for the use of transfer pricing for the oil and gas 
companies and the purposes of use of advisory assistance. 
In accordance with the obtained results the main role of TP advisory concerning transfer pricing 
issues is to ensure the compliance with tax legislation and minimize tax burden. Where “to ensure the 
compliance with tax legislation” has been chosen 8 times as of utmost importance and minimize tax 
burden has been chosen 5 times. And as the least important “to maintain the market position has been 
chosen” as not important 3 times and “to increase the competitiveness of the company” two times. 
It is possible to see the illustration to this question in the figure 4.4 that demonstrated in the chart 
“What is the main role of the TP advisory concerning transfer pricing?”. 
 
Figure 4.4. The main role of the TP advisory concerning transfer pricing 
The answers for the previous questions are supported by the data received from the next question 
about the company’s (client) main goal in relation to the transfer pricing practices. Respondents have 
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allocated at average 56,7% to the 'compliance and tax optimization», 20,9% to the «Optimize 
resource allocation and performance management between the units» and 22,4% to the both position 
simultaneously. 
The next group of questions asked the consultants to estimate the procedure of the documentation. 
58,3% of the consultants ascribed the procedure as the medium level of the complexity which 
requires less experience, but a lot of documentation and 41,7% respondents ascribed high level of 
complexity, which stands for highly-qualified personnel and a lot of documentation, none of the audit 
employees consider the procedure to be easy. When the consultants were asked about the 
development of this process, practically everyone (10 out of 12) stated the integration of the 
automation and the decrease of the amount of documents as well as “Simplification of documentation 
needed to be disclosed”. 
Among the benefits of preparation of transfer pricing study for a company, except being an 
obligatory procedure “less problems with tax authorities”, “no benefits, it's obligatory”. The 
respondents also pointed out that: “absolutely required with annual update - In order to complete 
documentation and check compliance with market intervals”, “tax legislation compliance, tax burden 
optimization, effective allocation of resources between companies of the group”, “to confuse the tax 
authorities”. They also suggested to use it in business “it can be renewed and it is a substantial 
study”, “an opportunity to optimize business structure and reallocate profit and losses between 
companies of the group, helps to analyze the company's performance”. 
91,67% of the respondents think that advisor/tax practitioner with a specific designation should 
prepare a transfer study. 
Last group of the question was about the interaction between transfer pricing (TP) advisory and the 
company. 58,3% of advisors think that clients often ask them for advice concerning transfer pricing 
issues, 25% that sometimes and 16,7% that seldom. In the question whether the TP advisory 
assistance influences the organizational structure of the company- 66,7% respondents choose “no” 
and 33,3% “yes”. Those who choose “yes” were asked how in their opinion the structure is being 
influenced and among the obtained results there were: “TP method can influence the organization 
structure. Consequently, if advisors choose it, they influence the structure”, “In order to fit changing 
TP legislation and at the same time to save existing tax benefits”, TP advisor can recommend to 
“restructure business”, “TP is one of the basements of group structuring”, “shows possibilities of 
restructuring the business processes for optimal allocation of resources between units”. 
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4.3. Managers’ view 
Two interviews with top managers of the companies were conducted. Both of these companies are 
vertically-integrated oil and gas companies. They are on the list of the 10 Russian biggest companies 
of this sector. The questions to the managers are presented in the interview guide (Appendix 2). The 
received answers are suppose to provide insider information on the transfer pricing issues in oil and 
gas sector taking as an example the current situation with transfer pricing system in the selected oil 
and gas companies. 
Organizational structure of the company 
The first group of questions was aimed at the organizational structure of the companies. According to 
the received answers, both of the companies possess all the parts of the value chain process: 
“yes, we have all the parts of the value chain process from production to retail” (expert A), “it’s a 
vertically integrated company, so it has up-stream, down-stream and we are not talking about what 
sometimes is called mid-stream, which is the supply trading and logistics function, what some other 
companies call the integrated supply and trading. By virtue of being vertically integrated company 
we might say that from the well - head to the pump. If I were to list them that would be probably 
exploration and production, then transportation which is the pipes basically, logistics to the refinery, 
refining and then re-tail, so these are the traditional” (an expert B). 
However, the companies are not diversified: 
“we are not presented in different industries, we extract gas and gas condensate, so it’s diversified 
only in two ways. However, from the well-head there is only one stream, it is impossible to produce 
gas without gas condensate” (expert A), 
“well, it’s not diversified, it’s mainly presented in one industry and is concentrated on the retail – we 
sell the oil products” (an expert B). 
Operational decisions are taken by the unit management according to one respondent, however the 
second one pointed out that it depends on the type of the decision that is to be taken: 
“it depends on the sort of operational decision. Typically, this will vary from one company to 
another. So in some companies decisions are very strictly centralized like Rosneft as you probably 
know very well is famous for delegating very little authority downstairs and having most of the 
decisions concentrated upstairs, specifically in the hands of the CEO. The company where I work N, 
there is more delegation of authorities that flows downwards, but you typically have different limits 
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depending on the scale of the question that needs to be addressed, so if it’s a question of everyday 
operation, typically, the highest it will rise is the head of local subsidiary» (expert B). 
Limits become more and more important when it comes to the capital budgeting 
«if we look now at the capital budgeting then there is a very clear delegation of authority up to 
certain limit above which the questions or the initiatives are absolutely have to go to the 
headquarters and then, perhaps, as high as to the boards of directors». 
When the respondent was asked to define more precisely the limits after which the decision is to be 
taken by the top management, not the management of the unit, he said that 
«In N it would be up to 100 million rubles they were thinking of revising it to 500 million rubles, for 
the lowest level company», «This is standards, for example, in TNK-BP, the projects that would 
exceed 100 million $ would go to the boards of directors and they have to be approved by both 
groups». Also, an investment committee plays not the last role in the decision taking, though this 
body is not responsible for the decisions itself” (expert B). 
And in both companies the salary of the unit management depends on the unit’s profit. 
Transfer pricing methods used in the company 
When the managers were asked the questions about the transfer pricing, I found some 
misunderstanding as one of the managers inadvertently immediately ascribed some negative aspect to 
the transfer price, meaning that it definitely implies the minimization of the tax base and saying that 
“It is too easy to check anything in our business, it is not complicated to check everything in oil and 
gas sector. Especially when you sell something through the custom. Anything can be seen there” 
(expert A). 
However, expert from company B said that 
“if I am refining and produce a certain petrol refines products and these products ultimately are to 
end up in my retail subsidiary as they have to pass from one segment to another, as you said in the 
very beginning  – the value chain process, from one section to another and this transaction has to 
happen at a certain price level». 
The next question concerning transfer pricing was about the methods used in the companies. Among 
the applied methods they mention 
«the netback price- it is the export price without transportation expenses» (expert A) 
and 
  68 
«they are very different and it very much depends on the managerial agreement to keep the margin in 
one place or another» (expert B). 
An expert B also stated that there is a difference between managerial and financial accounting «even 
though you have a formal transfer pricing happening in line with the legislation and legislative and 
stipulative standards you also have managerial accounting. Management may actually want to see 
which type of the business gives them more value different from the financial accounting shows them 
that». 
Sometimes from the point of view of managerial accounting: 
«It is more objective to impute to demonstrate more ownership from you than from my ownership 
even though when I sell it to you at the market to you my margin can be very high formally» (expert 
B). 
The manager was asked to specify this issue to the oil and gas industry, why is it happening there: 
«the reason why this is done is, for example, the certain profitability that I need to keep in the 
refining to make sure refining projects renumerate for themselves, payback for themselves, but I also 
want to show the bulk of the value created lower down the value chain. This is where I start to play 
with or manipulate my transfer price I would imagine that the same thing happens with upstream», 
«in company where I work they use one transfer price for retail and another transfer price for small 
wholesale» (expert B). 
So, according to the experts, the choice of the method depends on 
«how management wants to reallocate profits for the packs of accountings inside the company» 
(expert B). 
For the particular downstream department of the company N the transfer pricing method used was 
refinery gate price. 
The experts have never heard about the use methods yielded from the arm's length principle, though 
“it would be something closer to the cost-plus price” (expert B). 
He explained this choice as follows: 
“You have a particular product and a price for this product got example in the North European 
market, you bring this price and deduct from this exportation expenses and so on and then you end 
up with the price at refinery gate and then you add up once again all the transportation costs and this 
is the price that you finally get. You don’t have a database that would tell you that tis actually the 
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price, so it’s always depends. They all are intended just to create a system that is robust and it can be 
explained to the regulative” (expert B). 
Talking about the Advance pricing agreements the company A has it but B does not. That means that 
even not all the big oil and gas companies have concluded that type of agreements. 
Decision-making regarding transfer pricing issues 
In both cases, this is central management that is responsible for the settlement of transfer price 
“central management almost without exception” and “top management”. Though the manager A 
thinks that the management of the units are not inclined to hide any kind of information from the top 
management, however, 
the manager from the company B said that 
“yes, that happed in TNK-BP, yes that happens sometimes, it does happen sometimes where the 
transfer price depends on the lobbying power of any particular group of managers». 
External activities concerning Transfer pricing 
Both experts stated that it is not difficult to communicate with the regulation authorities. A manager 
from company A: 
“usually such big companies have their own regulation body that controls its operations” Though the 
manager from the company A said that the procedure of the documentation itself is really 
complicated. 
“No, I don't think so. In big companies a lot of people work on it. Big companies are typically audited 
by other big companies so before it is being made public, all the books are cleaned and all the books 
are made available. There were not big deals, people usually hear about them, those that I heard of 
were the big fines imposed for price read and it was back in TNK-BP. So quite a few oil majors were 
subject to that case, but transfer pricing – no” (expert B). 
About the use audit assistance: 
«as any public company uses it» (expert A). 
«The audit companies will help to make sure that your accounting reports are presented in the 
proper manner, they will do that and they will make sure that the profits are shown where they 
actually belong» (expert B). 
The experts were also asked about whether the audit companies are involved into the transfer pricing 
system within the company. 
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“So, for example, financial director of downstream decides how we define the transfer price for retail 
and for small wholesale for the purpose of the next stage period, so of course, no external 
involvement at this stage. As its basically at the later stage when they come in and help with 
reporting its perfunctory affair nothing that is concerned to be with TP in particular” (an expert B). 
Recommendations 
The managers were asked to give their advice on how the transfer pricing system can be developed 
within the company and if there are any drawbacks. 
“Guidelines and people try to work around these guideline, that they show the value they create to 
the business the best way possible. For example, the small wholesale system was organized in such a 
way that if you calculate the transfer price in one way it will be strongly negative and if you twiddled 
your assumptions and looked at the complicated triangulation of the transfer price and add some 
export channels and weighed them differently you end up with board line but still profitable business, 
that to me seems bad because this is basically where you open Pandora box, as you basically say it is 
almost economic relativism, it depends on how we looked at it, what is actually very bad for a 
company, as the company should have a robust and well-grounded financial decisions. You need to 
be able to falsify it and with this kind of approach you can not do it. You either make it more 
profitable or less profitable business just on your assumptions which I think is a very powerful 
analytical drawback” (expert B). 
The experts also were asked to tell how the procedure of the information disclosure can be improved. 
“all this principle of the control over the transfer pricing should be annihilated as any regulation 
body should supervise not one unit of the company but all the group of companies as a whole, not to 
look at how the transactions are made within the group of companies, but how they are made out of 
the group. Stop finding the drawbacks where they are not any. As in all developed countries the 
transactions within the units are not monitored. In general, a group of companies is being audited 
not every unit separately. The International Financial Reporting Standards were designed for these 
purposes. We have to follow International Financial Reporting Standards, but legislative base is not 
in compliance with them. The transactions between the interdependent persons, their definitions do 
not match the civil legislation that tackles the issues of affiliation. That is why sometimes we have 
disputes with tax authorities” (expert A). 
The expert from company B gave very interesting attitude to the way the transfer pricing system can 
be developed within the company and who should be responsible for decision making. He said that 
besides the top management there should also be an external stakeholder:  
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«The projects, the decisions upon this projects need to be made with an objective basis and state may 
not always be that objective. There needs to be an objective expert, the government can also have 
some interests and won’t be objective, that’s why it should be somebody else”. 
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5. Analytical chapter 
To begin with, it is necessary to say that results presented in the empirical chapter now will be 
studied and analyzed that found a reflection in more than one sources of the information: documents, 
questionnaires and interviews. That organization of the examination will point out if there are 
different views about how transfer pricing is defined in Russian oil and gas companies. 
Aims of the new rules and the reflection of companies 
According to the studied documents, the initial aims of the new rules were the harmonization and the 
increase of the efficiency of tax control over the correctness of the calculation. As well as the control 
over the full payment of taxes in the cases of transfer pricing application, specification of the list of 
the affiliated parties and improvement of the foundations for the price determination in the controlled 
transactions. According to the consultants the companies started to use the TP advisory in order “to 
ensure the compliance with tax legislation”. 
However, as it has been mentioned in the overview of the current situation regarding transfer pricing 
in Russia, PWC found that companies found it difficult to keep up with all the new rules. Application 
of the new transfer pricing rules is associated with certain difficulties: 
 lack of clarity in the interpretation of some acts; 
 the complexness of the completing the tax notice; 
 vagueness of the approaches to the control of market intragroup financial transactions and 
transactions with intangible assets. 
Taking into account the responses of taxpayers, the government tried to ease the burden on taxpayers 
with a help of: 
 postponement of the deadline for the submission of the documentation on the controlled 
transactions of the year 2012 to November 20th, 2013 (instead of May 20th submission, as set 
by the Tax Code for the remaining periods); 
 postponement of the deadline for the submission of transfer pricing documentation for the 
year 2012 to December 1st, 2013 (instead of June 1st, 2013 (as determined by the general rule 
for all other periods); 
 exemption from the control of certain financial transactions, the terms of which were agreed 
upon by the parties prior to the entry into force of the new provisions of the Code and that 
stood unchanged during 2012; 
  73 
 provision of clarifications, regarding the possibility of grouping certain types of transactions 
 the development of the number of additional initiatives proposed by the business community 
(for example, cost allocation bill) (PWC, 2016). 
Organizational structure of the companies 
Talking about the organizational structure of the companies, most of them possess more than two 
components of the value chain process according to consultants (53,8% as average) and that they 
have all the parts “from the well-head up to the customer like Rosneft or Gazpromneft” according to 
the experts. Both advisors and managers think that the companies are not diversified, but “highly 
specified and try to concentrate their business and resources in one sector”, “we are not presented in 
different industries, we extract gas and gas condensate, so its diversified only in two ways” or 
“present in two industries (43% average allocated to this item)” (advisors). 
However, 53,8% of consultants think that most of the operational decisions in oil and gas sector are 
made by the central management, though according to the insider information, that is the unit 
management who is responsible for operational decisions or there are certain limits (usually 
monetary) up to which the unit management is responsible, still the every-day decisions are in the 
hands of the head of the local subsidiary. 
“you typically have different limits depending on the scale of the question that needs to be addressed, 
so if it’s a question of everyday operation, typically, the highest it will rise is the head of local 
subsidiary» (expert B). 
Limits become more and more important when it comes to the capital budgeting:  
«if we look now at the capital budgeting then there is a very clear delegation of authority up to 
certain limit above which the questions or the initiatives are absolutely have to go to the 
headquarters and then, perhaps, as high as to the boards of directors». 
When the respondent was asked to define more precisely the limits after which the decision is to be 
taken by the top management, not the management of the unit, he said that 
«In N it would be up to 100 million rubles they were thinking of revising it to 500 million rubles, for 
the lowest level company», «This is standards, for example, in TNK-BP, the projects that would 
exceed 100 million $ would go to the boards of directors and they have to be approved by both 
groups». Also, an investment committee plays not the last role in the decision taking, though this 
body is not responsible for the decisions itself”. 
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Transfer pricing methods used 
The study of the legislative documents showed that Tax regulation has legally confirmed the use of 
the transfer pricing methods proposed by the OECD in the transfer pricing regulation process.  
However, there is no division of these methods into traditional transaction methods and transaction 
profit methods. Among the most often used methods yielded from the OECD guidelines, consultants 
named uncontrolled price method and transactional net margin method share the second position 
(31,7% and 28,3% consequently). However, the managers from the companies are not aware of that 
types of methods, they called «the netback price- it is the export price without transportation 
expenses». 
«they are very different and it very much depends on the managerial agreement to keep the margin in 
one place or another» (expert B). 
An expert B also stated that there is a difference between managerial and financial accounting «even 
though you have a formal transfer pricing happening in line with the legislation and legislative and 
stipulative standards you also have managerial accounting. Management may actually want to see 
which type of the business gives them more value different from the financial accounting shows them 
that». 
Sometimes from the point of view of managerial accounting: 
«It is more objective to impute to demonstrate more ownership from you than from my ownership 
even though when I sell it to you at the market to you my margin can be very high formally» (expert 
B). 
The manager was asked to specify this issue to the oil and gas industry, why is it happening there: 
«the certain profitability that I need to keep in the refining to make sure refining projects renumerate 
for themselves, payback for themselves, but I also want to show the bulk of the value created lower 
down the value chain. This is where I start to play with or manipulate my transfer price I would 
imagine that the same thing happens with upstream» (expert B). 
That is why the choice of the method depends on «how management wants to reallocate profits for 
the packs of accountings inside the company». 
Still, after being given an overview of the OECD methods, one of the experts has chosen a cost-plus 
method. So, among the adjusted external-market price, cost-based price and negotiated price, the one 
to be applied in Russian oil and gas companies is the cost-based price. 
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Decision-making regarding transfer pricing issues 
The answers of the experts and consultants to this group of questions were pretty much the same. 
73,8% of advisors think that it is central management who is responsible for decision making 
regarding transfer pricing issues and the experts answered “central management almost without 
exception” and “top management”. Though the experts have different positions on the process of 
hiding of information from the central management. The manager A thinks that the management of 
the units are not inclined to hide it, however, the manager B faced that kind of problems in TNK-BP: 
“yes, that happed in TNK-BP, yes that happens sometimes, it does happen sometimes where the 
transfer price depends on the lobbying power of any particular group of managers». 
How are international practices, international guidelines incorporated (OECD recommendations 
and guidelines)? 
According to the empirical results, the documents the OECD guidelines are not considered to be 
normative legislative acts in Russia and are not binding on tax payers. Regulation authorities use 
these guidelines while choosing the cases and carrying out the analysis of the transactions between 
the interdependent persons. 
For example, some of the statutes of OECD guidelines are implemented in Russian transfer pricing 
legislation. Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation tries to incorporate the OECD guidelines. 
For example, the selection of cases that can be examined is in accordance with the UN Practical 
Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries. The UN Practical Transfer Pricing Manual for 
Developing Countries article 4.4.3.4. chapter 4, October 2012 outlines the factors that tax authorities 
of different countries use while choosing the company for the tax control regarding the question of 
transfer pricing. In Russia, there is a practice of the risk analysis when the tax authorities choose the 
outstanding cases for the study. 
The Russian Federation being an observer of OECD and a candidate to join the organization, has 
legally confirmed the use of the transfer pricing methods proposed by the OECD. However, there is 
no official division of these methods into traditional transaction methods and transaction profit 
methods. 
58,3% of the respondents to the questionnaires stated that the methods yielded from the arm’s length 
principle are practiced quite often, however, as it has been mentioned in the previous section, the 
companies’ managers are not aware of them. These are advisors who make the audit of the 
companies’ books are aware of them. Even though they know them, they are bound to the Russian 
tax legislation what can be proved by the consultants’ answers 91,7 % of whom pointed Russian 
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legislative system on the first place and only 8,3% noted that oil and gas companies try to keep to the 
both systems. However, consultants named several countries, examples of which are taken into 
account while establishing the successful transfer pricing strategy: US, Europe, UK in particular. 
The procedure of the information disclosure 
As according to the item 1, Article 105.15 of the Tax Code a taxpayer is required to provide the 
documentation regarding controlled transactions in a certain form, Federal Tax Service recommends 
stages of preparation of documentation regarding controlled transactions. There are 9 of them. 
On the one hand, 58,3% of the consultants ascribed the medium level of the complexity to this 
procedure which requires less experience, but a lot of documentation and 41,7% respondents ascribed 
high level of complexity what stands for highly-qualified personnel and a lot of documentation. They 
think that the documentation process needs simplification and the decrease in the amounts of the 
required documents. 
On the other hand, they do not find this procedure difficult, they say that there are special 
departments which work on the preparation of this documentation or that they are being audited. «Big 
companies are typically audited by other big companies so before it is being made public, all the 
books are cleaned and all the books are made available». Moreover, sometimes regulation 
authorities form special bodies that supervise the activities of a particular company, and it is easier to 
solve the problems with the special body. 
What are the Advance pricing agreements in Russia? 
Once again, advance pricing agreement is an agreement between a great tax payer and tax authorities 
that helps to agree upon the way the transfer price is determined and the transfer pricing method used 
for tax assessment purposes in cases with particular controlled transactions, comprising the cases 
before the transactions are carried out, to minimize the number of possible disputable points 
regarding the price determination for tax assessment purposes. 
The advisors think that “two-four” or “more than four” companies have advance pricing agreements, 
however, according to the statistics presented by PWC (2016) there are 15 companies in all the 
sectors of economy that have that type of agreements in Russia. Thus, an expert A said that their 
company has it, though the other one doesn’t. 
External activities concerning Transfer pricing 
All the big companies are supposed to be audited. They do it in order to make all their book in 
compliance with the standards, «clean» and available to the public. Though consultants think that 
they are asked not just to accomplish that task, but also their advice regarding transfer pricing system 
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in the companies. The advisors keep in mind that they can influence the organizational structure of 
the companies through the transfer pricing practices, however, the experts pointed out that the 
auditors are involved to the process only at the later stages when all the main issues regarding the 
central questions are sorted out. 
«as any public company uses it» (expert A). 
«The audit companies will help to make sure that your accounting reports are presented in the 
proper manner, they will do that and they will make sure that the profits are shown where they 
actually belong» (expert B). 
The experts were also asked about whether the audit companies are involved into the transfer pricing 
system within the company. 
“So, for example, financial director of downstream decides how we define the transfer price for retail 
and for small wholesale for the purpose of the next stage period, so of course, no external 
involvement at this stage. As its basically at the later stage when they come in and help with 
reporting its perfunctory affair nothing that is concerned to be with TP in particular”. 
Recommendations 
In relation to the new rules, the consultants are not satisfied with the procedure of the information 
disclosure. Practically everyone (10 out of 12) stated the integration of the automation. 
There were some radical suggestions concerning the work of tax authorities. The expert A found the 
system inefficient and said that the companies are bound to follow International Financial Reporting 
Standards though the legislative base is not in compliance with them. Moreover, the definition of the 
transactions between the interdependent persons does not match the civil legislation that provokes 
disputes with the authorities. Moreover, he thinks that tax authorities are to supervise not only one 
unit of the company but all the units as an integrative body, not to monitor the transactions within this 
body, but outside. 
The expert B stated that while choosing the transfer pricing system there is a need for robust and 
well-grounded financial decisions. The decisions that are being made are to be falsified. However, 
there is not such a system for transfer pricing, there is no a universal database that shows the market 
price for the controlled transactions. What is more, of course, there are not any guidelines that show 
how to reallocate profits between the units to make the company more efficient and minimize the tax 
base within a legal framework.  
“You either make one unit more profitable or less profitable business just on your assumption what 
can be regarded as a very strong analytical drawback” (expert B). 
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Moreover, one of the experts pointed out that there is need to include an external stakeholder in the 
decision making process regarding transfer pricing. There is to be an expert that will be able to make 
objective decisions and neither a person from the company nor from the government can be unbiased. 
In general, what has been found with a help of this research project: 
 companies mostly use transfer pricing if they want to reallocate profits between the 
profitability centers; 
 according to the consultants their main aim is to minimize tax burden; 
 however, they use TP advisory assistance not to minimize tax burden but to make the books 
be in compliance with the legislation; 
 companies use those transfer pricing methods that better suits the situation, in particular a 
certain part of the value chain process (different transfer pricing methods are used in different 
departments); 
 companies use TP advisory assistance only to a certain level, consultants are mostly involved 
at the level of “day to day” operations and they do not influence transfer pricing policy or 
practices; 
 companies have to incorporate international guidelines though they do not always match the 
current legislation that is why they are oriented at the Russian legislation at first, that actually 
retards the process of the implementation of the successful international practices; 
 oil and gas companies are not satisfied with the regulative control that is exercised over the 
company. They are concerned that authorities supervise the companies of the group separately 
and do not monitor all the companies of the group at once. 
Theory versus practice 
Here it is to outline the most important points that found contradictions with theory. 
In the theoretical framework it has been studied that there are certain conditions when the vertical 
integration in the company becomes more favorable than the market. Moreover, the transaction costs 
examine the mechanism of the vertical integration that diminishes the transaction costs. 
The study showed that the companies that operate in oil and gas sector are tend to be highly vertically 
integrated ones. They expand to the whole value chain process in other words they are present at 
every stage from the well-head to the distribution to the final customer. By virtue of this a company 
decreases its transactional costs. 
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Williamson outline factors when the transactional costs become maximal –  
 specificity of the resources involved in the transaction process 
 frequency with which a certain transaction occurs; 
 the level of uncertainty 
All these factors are inherent in the oil and gas sector: hydrocarbon resources are specific, the 
transactions occur on a constant base at a high rate, and the oil and gas environment possess a certain 
level of uncertainty even if we consider the current situation with the oil prices. Thus for companies 
it is more profitable to become a vertically integrated one and to continue the expansion. 
Transfer pricing in centralized and decentralized firms 
According to the study provided by Pashkus on the transfer price settlement in centralized and 
decentralized firms that was discussed in the theoretical framework, these types of companies possess 
several differences while choosing the transfer price. 
In decentralized firm – there is a possibility of using external market, freedom of the transfer price 
settlement, lack of reporting to the top management, this is the manager of the unit who is responsible 
for decision making, existence of the internal market, multi-functional assets. 
The study proved some points that in Russia in decentralized oil and gas companies: 
 there is lack of reporting to the top management; 
 an internal market does exist 
but also some contradictories were found: 
 manager of the unit is responsible for decision making but within certain limits that depend on 
the firm - the higher is the limit up to which the decisions can be made by a unit manager the 
higher is the possibility that the unit manager will hide the information from the central 
management; 
 managers are not free to use the external market; 
 managers of the unit can not settle the transfer price, it is only in powers of top management 
to do that. 
For the centralized companies the theory was confirmed with the evidences from the study. 
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The aims of transfer pricing 
A system of transfer pricing should motivate divisional managers to make effective decisions and 
provide information for their justification. However, as it has been found out the behavior of the 
divisional managers in decentralized firms can imply an opportunistic component, they can hide the 
information from the top manager, by this not contributing to the profit of the company as a whole 
but to the profits of a particular unit. 
Responsibility centers 
The division of the company into centers helps to decrease the time needed to make a decision and to 
react to the customers’ requests, to raise the efficiency of the accounting system, to monitor revenues 
and to evaluate the results of the divisional activities.  
In terms of transfer pricing, it comes to the profits centers during the choice of the transfer pricing 
method that depends on «how management wants to reallocate profits for the packs of accountings 
inside the company». 
Choice of transfer pricing method 
Concerning the choice of methods-cost-based price, adjusted external- market price, negotiated price. 
Companies are more oriented on the cost-based price. The adjusted external-market price where 
prices on the external market serve as the referent for determining the values of internal transfers 
(Dan Li. M.P. Ferreira, 2008) are not used as there is lack of information regarding the independent 
transactions in the external market. 
The negotiated price is also not typical for the Russian oil and gas companies, as it is the top 
management who sets the transfer price and choose the transfer pricing policy, not the managers of 
the trading profit centers. 
Benchmarking 
Benchmark in transfer pricing is to analyze the most often used transfer price in the external market. 
According to the theory transfer pricing benchmarking review helps company to mitigate the possible 
risks tied to transfer prices being in compliance with the arm's length principle, to evaluate company's 
performance in comparison with the independent company in the market and consequently establish 
appropriate transfer price. 
However, the study showed that companies do not possess an open data base that will provide the 
information on the transactions between the affiliated companies, consequently companies are tend to 
rely on their own assumption or on the cost-based principle.  
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6. Conclusions 
The aim of this project was to find an answer to the posed in the introduction research question «how 
is transfer pricing defined in oil and gas sector in Russia». 
With the help of the literature study of the international experience of the transfer pricing, the 
overview of the situation regarding transfer pricing in Russia, Russian oil and gas sector and the 
robust economic theories I was able to elaborate a proper research design to study the topic. The 
analysis of the legislative base, the points of view of the consultants and experts from the oil and gas 
companies made possible to examine the question from a triangle perspective – how is transfer 
pricing defined in oil and gas sector in Russia? 
To sum up, it is possible to name several issues that were outlined during the work: 
Firstly, transfer pricing is still new for the Russian economy. People find it not as an effective market 
mechanism, but as a way to illegally minimize tax burden. Russian companies do not have enough 
experience to work with transfer pricing rules within the legal base. Moreover, they do not trust the 
government, they are trying to find different ways to decrease taxes by shifting profits to law-tax 
jurisdictions, though the new rules are being introduced. 
Secondly, despite the fact that the international practices are being incorporated, Russian tax 
legislation is not always in compliance with them. Although in most cases companies have to follow 
rules expressed in the Russian legislative acts, sometimes organizations have to implement 
international practices and at this very moment the disputes of the interpretation of the legislative 
base occur. 
Thirdly, there is not a universal/integral base where companies can find information upon the 
controlled transactions and the transfer pricing benchmarking review is viewed as a rather 
complicated process. Thus, it is hard to settle the market price for the controlled transactions between 
the units and the companies mostly used cost-based price as a transfer price. 
Fourthly, not all the companies are aware of the OECD guidelines being introduced and applied by 
Russian tax authorities to supervise their controlled transactions. 
Fifthly, the new law introduced by the Russian government took legal effect only in 2012, 
consequently, the new rules have not shown the impact that they have made as the publication of the 
first statistics is intended only to the year 2016. 
All in all, transfer pricing in oil and gas sector in Russia can be characterized as a young phenomenon 
that is still to inherit the successful international practices: 
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 not all the introduced rules are in compliance with the tax legislation; 
 there is still lack of trust to the governmental bodies and lack of the highly-qualified 
information regarding the transfer pricing questions.  
However, there is a potential for the development of the transfer pricing system in oil and gas sector 
in Russia. The government is interested in the maximization of the tax base of the companies that 
work with naturals resources, consequently, with those whose profits are the biggest in the Russian 
economy, companies are also intend to make their transactions be subjected to the legal framework. 
There is a need to integrate an automation component to the process of the communication with the 
tax authorities. It will facilitate the process of the information disclosure and increase the level of 
trust to the tax authorities. The automation of the process of the documentation submission will allow 
to eliminate or at least decrease a human factor. Consequently, the system will become more 
transparent that will grow the trust. 
Still while the automation is not on the raw, companies should make use of the prefilling conference 
with tax authorities which makes clear the number and the nature of documents to be submitted as 
well as fasten the procedure of the conclusion of the advance pricing agreement, taking into account 
peculiarities of a particular case. 
Moreover, there is a need to make the international guidelines that are to be used by the Russian 
companies to be in compliance with the Russian legislative base. For example, companies have to 
follow International Financial Reporting Standards, but legislative base is not in compliance with 
them. The transactions between the interdependent persons, their definitions do not match the civil 
legislation that tackles the issues of affiliation. 
Another point is an external stakeholder that can help to develop the transfer pricing system by 
bringing an objective component to the decision making process. Government can not be an external 
stakeholder as it wants to maximize the tax base consequently has its own interests. An external 
stakeholder could be an expert from the relative sphere. 
The government has not only to provide the clarification letter on the use of the new rules but also to 
organize more dialogues with the representatives of the audit firms and companies’. The consultants 
can give an external overview of the situation, as they work with different organizations and can sum 
up the questions that are typical for the sector, and the experts from the companies can provide the 
information concerning the insider problems regarding the implementation of the new rule. 
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Further research 
It can be worth to consider to increase in the number of the respondents to the questionnaires that will 
help to give more robust picture of the current situation – about 10 consultants from each Big 4 
company. As well to increase the number of the experts from the oil and gas companies - for 
example, experts from Russian major oil and gas companies. 
Moreover, the research can be repeated after the first statistics regarding the implementation of the 
new rules are to be published. These statistics will show the impact of the amendments to the 
legislative base, its strong and weak points. 
Furthermore, a new research can analyze not only the legislative base but the view of the 
representatives of the tax authorities, how they find the system itself, how they see the 
implementation process, its drawbacks and strengths from the governmental point of view, what it 
means from the point of view of a supervisor. 
Also, it would be interesting to find out what international successful practices could suit Russian 
business environment but have not been introduced yet. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
All the questions are related to the companies that operate in the oil and gas sector 
 
1. The organization structure of the companies 
 
1.1. The level of the vertical integration in the company. How many parts (components) of the 
value chain process do companies possess? 
 More than two components (production, distribution, retail) 
 Two components 
 One component 
 
1.2. The level of the diversification.  
 Present in more than two industries 
 Present in two industries 
 Present in one industry 
 
1.3. The level of the centralization 
 Operational decisions are made by central management 
 Operational decisions are made both by central and unit management 
 Operational decisions are made by unit management 
 
2. Transfer pricing methods used 
 
2.1 What are the transfer pricing methods used by your clients? 
 Traditional transaction methods (comparable uncontrolled price method, r esale price 
method, cost-plus method) 
 Transactional profit methods (profit split method, transactional net margin method) 
 Others (if those that they use are not mentioned, please specify) 
 





2.3 Do any of the companies use APAs (Advance Pricing Agreements)? 
 More than four companies 
 Few of them (two-four) 
 Less than two 
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3.  How are international practices taken into account  
 





3.2 Companies are trying to keep to the: 
 Russian tax legislation 
 OECD principles 
 Both 
 
3.3 Which countries experince is taken as an example during the transfer price settlement in 
companies? 
 
3.4 Which OECD guidelines are still negligable in Russia, but can be introduced in order to 
improve the settlement of the transfer price? 
 
4. Decisions related to the transfer pricing practices 
 
4.1 What organizational structure does choose the TP method? 
 Central management (CEO, CFO, etc.) 
 Unit management (business unit, division) 
 Both central and unit management 
 If others, please, specify 
 
4.2. Who is responsible for the settlement of the transfer price? 
 Central management (CEO, CFO, etc.) 
 Unit management (business unit, division) 
 Cooperation between central and unit management  
 Others (if others, please, specify) 
 
5. Motivations for the use of transfer pricing for the oil and gas companies. 
 
5.1 What is the main role of the TP advisory concerning transfer pricing? 
 Minimize tax burden 
 Ensure the compliance with tax legislation 
 Increase the competitiveness of the company 
 Maintain the market position 
 Evaluate company’s performance 
 Enhance the cooperation between the units 
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Respondents are easked to ascribe level of importance: 
 Not important 
 Of low importance 
 Of medium importance 
 Very important 
 Of utmost importance 
 
5.2 What is the company’s (client) main goal in relation to the transfer pricing practices? 
(allocate percentages) 
 Compliance and tax optimization 
 Optimize resource allocation and performance management between the units 
 Both of the stated 
 
6. Preparation of the transfer pricing documentation 
 
6.1 How complicated do you find the procedure of preparation and submission of the 
disclosure? 
 High (Highly-qualified personnel and a lot of documentation) 
 Medium (less experience but a lot of documentation) 
 Low (little experience and little documentation) 
 
6.2 How can it be developed? 
 
6.3 What are the benifits of preparation of a transfer pricing study for a company? 
 





7. Interaction between TP advisory and the company 
 
7.1 How often do the clients ask for the TP advice? 
 Often (most of the issues concerning TP) 
 Sometimes (important issues) 
 Seldom (only critical issues) 
 
7.2. Does the TP advisory assistance influence the organizational structure of the company? 
 If yes, then how? (open question) 
  




I conduct a survey for my Master Thesis as a part of the dual Energy Management program in 
the University of Nordland/MGIMO. I am interested in how is transfer pricing defined in the oil and 
gas sector? 
I would like to get your opinion on this topic and would be really pleased if you agree to answer 
the questions. I should notify you that our conversation will be recorded or, if possible, some notes will 
be taken. And the interview will take about 30 minutes. So can I record our conversation? 
 
Questions about the organisational structure 
1. How many parts of the value chain process do companies possess? 
2. How deversified is the company? 
3. What do you think about the level of diversification? Can it be more/less diversified?  
4. How are most operational decisions made? By central management or by the unit 
management (both)? 
5. Does the salary of the unit management depend on the unit’s profit? 
 
Questions about the transfer pricing methods used in the company 
6. Is the transfer pricing system popular within the company? 
7. Which transfer pricing methods are more popular within the company? 
8. Is Arm’s length principle always in relation to the Transfer Pricing? 
9. Does the of the company use APAs (Advance Pricing Agreements)? 
10. Does the company use Transfer Pricing methods in compliance with OECD standards? 
 
Decision-making 
11. Who is responsible for the settlement of the transfer price? 
12. Does the transfer pricing system influence the informational flows within the organization? 
13. What do you think whether the units hide any information from the central management? 
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Intra activities concerning Transfer pricing? 
14. Does a company use an avdisory assistance? 
15. Does it help? In what way 
16. How difficult is it to communicate with the regulation authorities? 
17. What are the benefits of preparation of a transfer pricing study for a company? 
18. How do you find the procedure of the information disclosure? 
19. How can it be developed? 
 
Recommendations 
20. Why do the company use Transfer Pricing? 
21. What does the company want to achieve? 
22. How can Transfer Pricing be developed within the compay (which methods to choose)? 
23. Who should be responsible for the decision-making? 
  





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average 




How many parts 






100% in total) 
                          










20 70 20 20 40 35 30 20 40 25 15 20 29,6 
One component 
(production) 
20 5 20 10 20 5 20 0 20 5 75 0 16,7 






100% in total) 
                          
Present in more 
than two 
industries 
20 25 30 30 60 50 20 40 60 10 5 30 31,7 
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Present in two 
industries 
60 25 40 40 30 20 60 60 30 30 55 70 43,3 
Present in one 
industry 
20 50 30 30 10 30 20 0 10 60 40 0 25,0 






100% in total) 
                          
Operational 
decisions are 
made by central 
management 
30 80 40 25 60 20 40 20 70 80 80 90 52,9 
Operational 
decisions are 
made both by 
central and unit 
management 
60 15 30 50 20 20 30 60 20 15 15 10 28,8 
Operational 
decisions are 
made by unit 
management 
10 5 30 25 20 60 30 20 10 5 5 0 18,3 
Q4. What are the 
transfer pricing 
methods used 
by your clients? 
(distribute 
percentages, 
100% in total) 





5 30 50 25 30 50 25 20 30 25 30 20 28,3 
Resale price 
method 
8 0 0 15 0 0 20 0 0 10 5 0 4,8 
Cost-plus 
method 
60 30 10 25 30 0 15 40 40 65 65 0 31,7 
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Profit split 
method 




25 30 40 35 10 50 30 40 0 0 0 80 28,3 
Other (if other, 
please specify) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Q5. How often is 
the Arm’s length 
principle used in 
relation to the 
Transfer 
Pricing? 
                          
often + + + + +   +   + + +     
sometimes           +   +       +   
seldom                            






                          
More than four 
companies 
  + + +   +       +       
Few of them 
(two-four) 
+       +   + + +         








                          
Often +   + +       +   + + +   
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Sometimes 
        + + +   +         
Seldom 
  +                       
Q8. Companies 
are trying to 
keep to the: 
                          
Russian tax 
legislation 
+ + + + + + + + + +   +   
OECD principles 
                          
Both 





























still negligible in 
Russia, but can 
be introduced in 
order to improve 







































s of OECD 
TP 
Guideline









































choose the TP 
method?(allocat
e percentages, 
100% in total) 
                          
Central 
management 
(CEO, CFO, etc.) 





5 0 0 0 20 0 20 0 40 15 5 0 8,8 
Both central and 
unit 
management 
15 20 0 10 40 0 0 0 40 5 70 0 16,7 
Other (if other, 
please, specify) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0 
Q12. Who is 
responsible for 




100% in total) 
                        0,0 
Central 
management 
(CEO, CFO, etc.) 










15 20 0 10 30 0 0 0 30 5 75 0 15,4 
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Other (if other, 
please, specify) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0 
Q13: What is the 




















































































































































































































































Q14. What is the 
company’s (client) 
main goal in 
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Compliance and 
tax optimization 





between the units 
0 20 25 25 50 20 15 20 50 1 15 10 20,9 
Both of the stated 0 0 50 25 0 20 50 50 0 9 15 50 22,4 
Other (if other, 
please specify) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0 
Q15. How 
complicated do 
you find the 
procedure of 
preparation and 
submission of the 
disclosure? 
                          
High (Highly-
qualified 
personnel and a lot 
of documentation) 
  + + +     +     +       
Medium (less 
experience but a 
lot of 
documentation) 





                          
Q16. How can it be 
developed? 
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Q17. What are the 
benifits of 
preparation of a 
transfer pricing 















of the gruop 























it can be 
renewed 































Q18. Should a 
transfer pricing 
study be prepared 
by advisor/tax 
practitioner with a 
specific 
designation? 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes   
Q19. How often do 
the clients ask for 
the TP advice? 
                          
Often (most of the 
issues concerning 
TP) 
  + +   +       + + + +   
Sometimes 
(important issues) 
+     +     +             
Seldom (only 
critical issues) 
          +   +           




structure of the 
company? 
no yes no yes no no no no no yes no yes   
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TP is on of 
the 
basements 
of group 
structuring 
  
 
 
